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The West Bank, derived from its position on the western bank of the Jordan 
River, is the territory that came under Jordanian rule after the 1948 Arab-Israeli 
war and that has been occupied by Israel since the Six-Day War of 1967. Since 
this period, access to water in the West Bank has been largely controlled by 
Israel, with the consequence of severe water insecurities for Palestinians in 
sensitive areas like the Jordan Valley. This study, based on qualitative 
interviews conducted in July 2019, analyses how the infrastructure and power 
relations surrounding water governance have affected water security in the 
daily lives of Palestinians. It shows that while there are variations with regard 
to water access in the region, overall Palestinians in the Jordan Valley have 
serious difficulties in accessing acceptable quantities of water. In addition, they 
also experience water insecurities in terms of quality, distance and collection 
time, price and affordability, availability and reliability as well as safety. These 
water insecurities have had negative impacts on the physical, social and 
psychological well-being of Palestinians who are facing them. They affect 
women and girls to an even larger extent due to their productive and 
reproductive roles, that necessitate access to water (e.g., agricultural work, 
cleaning, cooking, bathing children) as well as due to their higher physiological 
water needs in comparison to men and boys, which are partly determined by 
social norms (e.g., wearing long hair and long clothes). 
The main obstacle to achieving water security for these people is the 
political context of the occupation with Israel having hegemonic control over 
transboundary water re-sources in terms of material, bargaining and ideational 
power. This is exemplified in the allocations of water resources and the 
management of water-related infrastructure according to the Oslo II Accord, 
that disadvantages the Palestinian side. The situation has further been 
worsened by the fragmented division of tasks related to the planning, 
regulation and distribution of water resources among the numerous Palestinian 
water sector actors, with women being rarely included in governance. 
Palestinians in the area have responded to shortcomings in terms of access 
to water with an array of flexible and adaptable strategies, such as storing water 
in tanks or reducing domestic water consumption. These strategies, also 
referred to as strategies of resilient resistance, as they show elements of both 
adaptation and resistance to the experienced conditions, are used on a daily 
basis, often in a combined manner, to improve water access. They are 
motivated by the connection between Palestinians and the land, which they 
believe should be protected from Israelis, as well as their lifestyles as farmers 
and herders. Refusing to submit to the control and ideology of the occupation, 
Palestinians also adopt the ideological and political strategy of ‘sumud’ 
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Water Governance under Occupation: 
A Contemporary Analysis of the Water Insecurities of 
Palestinians in the Jordan Valley, West Bank 
1  Water in the Jordan Valley, West Bank: Resources and 
Politics 
Water is life and people’s life can be grasped  
and studied through water. 
(Naguib 2009: 1) 
1.1 Research Problem 
Water is a life-giving substance, coursing through our bodies, our societies and 
our planet. Yet, it is a scarce resource and control over it has been disputed. 
Water has also been a major constituent of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, part 
of which is the Jordan Valley (West Bank1) – a region with abundant water 
resources and fertile land (Melon 2018: 7, Hareuveni 2011: 55). Being likened 
to a ‘giant greenhouse’, the Jordan Valley can contribute to food security, 
poverty reduction and economic development, which is considered crucial for 
the sustainability and viability of Palestinian independence (MA'AN 2010: 15, 
WB 2009: 25, Melon 2018: 7). 
Since the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967, distribution of and 
access to water lie largely within Israeli control. Among other things, the 
riverbanks of the Jordan River have been designated as military zones, 
prohibiting Palestinians access to the river (HRW 2015: 16). As a consequence, 
the Palestinian agricultural production has become fully dependent on rainfall 
and access to groundwater, which is strictly controlled and limited (Melon 
2018: 34, Graham-Brown 1990: 58). Therefore, most of the agricultural land is 
not irrigated; about 80 % is rain-fed with traditional dry-farming being the 
norm and a sharp fall in agricultural productivity (Dajani and Isma'il 2014: 10, 
Graham-Brown 1990: 54, Awwad 2016: 543). 
While several important studies have highlighted how human rights of 
Palestinians living under occupation are violated (e.g., Seidel and Tartir 2019, 
Akram et al. 2010), less attention has been given to how the governance of the 
water resources in the West Bank has affected the everyday lives of affected 
people (Naguib 2009: 161), which is the focus of this study. Edward Said wrote 
that the Palestinians have been routinely denied ‘permission to narrative’ (Said 
1984: 27). My thesis strives to provide a window into this narrative. 
 
1 The West Bank, derived from its location, describes the territory on the western 




1.2 Research Objectives and Questions 
The objective of this Research Paper is to analyze the nature of water 
governance in the West Bank and how it influences the everyday lives of 
Palestinians in the Jordan Valley. It focuses on the water insecurities faced by 
Palestinians as well as their responses under these circumstances. In doing so, 
the study seeks to render visible social injustices. To this end, the following 
main research question has been developed:  
 
How and why has the prevailing system of water governance in the West 
Bank affected water security of Palestinians in the Jordan Valley and in 
which ways have they responded and strategized under these 
circumstances?  
 
This question is approached based on three sub-questions: 
 
1. How are water resources in the West Bank distributed and what 
power relations underlie the distribution? 
2. How has this situation affected water security of Palestinians in 
the Jordan Valley in their daily lives? 
3. In which ways have Palestinians responded and strategized un-
der these circumstances? 
1.3 Contextual Background 
The creation of the State of Israel in 1948 in part of what had been British 
Mandate Palestine led to the expulsion of about 750,000 Palestinians from 
their homeland (Awwad 2016: 542). After the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the Green 
Line, or Armistice border, was established in 1949, dividing historic Palestine 
into three units: The State of Israel, the Gaza Strip under Egyptian rule and the 
West Bank annexed by the Kingdom of Jordan (Khamaisi 2008: 91). Following 
the Six-Day War in 1967, Israel occupied the Gaza Strip and the West Bank – 
the rest of historic Palestine. Under Israeli military administration, a variety of 
military orders and policies were issued, shaping Palestinian access to land and 
water resources (Awwad 2016: 542, 543). The Military Orders No. 92, 158 and 
291 introduced Israel’s full appropriation of water resources, assigning all water 
resources to the control of the Israeli military authorities, introducing a permit 
system for the construction of any new water installation and declaring all prior 
water agreements invalid (Messerschmid 2014: 55, 56). Numerous settlements 
– communities inhabited by Israeli citizens – were built across the West Bank 
which placed high demand on available water resources (Kelly 2006: 96).  
The first major Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation, the First 
Intifada, took place between 1987 and 1993, leading to the Oslo Accords I 
(1993) and II (1995), which were meant to provide Palestinians with the right 
to self-determination in the region (Abu-Baker 2017: 49, Wildeman 2019: 153). 
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The West Bank was divided into three areas with some responsibility given to 
the Palestinian National Authority (PA) in Areas A and B, which comprise 
about 41 % of the land of the West Bank, and full control to Israel in Area C, 
the remaining 59 % (Figure 1.1) (Koek 2013: 9). While water was referred to as 
a final status issue, the Oslo II Accord contained interim arrangements on 
water and sewage (WB 2009: 5). The agreement was intended to cover a period 
of five years (Abu-Baker 2017: 49). However, when this period ended without 
any successful permanent agreement, tensions boiled over into the Second 
Intifada (2000-2005) with both sides suffering from ongoing violence for years 
(Kelly 2006: 97). 
 
Figure 1.1 
Map of the West Bank with indication of areas according to the Oslo II Accord 




Currently, there are some 200 Israeli settlements in the West Bank that 
have access to water (B'Tselem 2019). Israel has also restricted Palestinian 
movement and access to land and resources through a combination of physical 
obstacles2, including the Separation Barrier3 and checkpoints, bureaucratic 
constraints (e.g., permit requirements) and the designation of areas as restricted 
or closed (OCHA 2015: 13).  
Ecologically, there are two abundant sources of fresh water in the area of 
the West Bank: the Jordan River and three aquifers collectively referred to as 
‘the Mountain Aquifer’, extending throughout the West Bank and Israel 




A: West Bank aquifers (or ‘the Mountain Aquifer’)  
B: Land elevation in the West Bank 
 
Source A: after SUSMAQ in Aliewi and Assaf 2007: 23, UN 2011. 
Source B: after ARIJ 2015: 14. 
 
 
2 A survey in 2018 recorded 705 permanent obstacles deployed by Israeli forces across 
the West Bank to control or restrict Palestinian vehicular or pedestrian movement 
(OCHA 2018). 
3 The Separation Barrier consists of fences and up to nine-meter-high concrete walls. 
It has a planned total length of 712 kilometres, running through the West Bank, along 







































The Jordan River is the only permanent river in the region, flowing 
roughly north to south from an altitude of 2200 meters above sea level, 
through the Lake Tiberias and into the Dead Sea as its final recipient at an 
altitude of 425 meters below sea level (ARIJ 2015: 36, PWA 2013b: 5, Bismuth 
et al. 2016: 94). The river’s basin is shared between Lebanon, Syria, Israel, 
Jordan and the West Bank (Bismuth et al. 2016: 94). Israel uses 64 % of the 
river’s total water while Palestinians are denied any share as well as physical 
access to the river (ARIJ 2015: 38, Koek 2013: 24). 
Groundwater is the main source of fresh water for Palestinians, 
representing 95 % of Palestinian water supply (PWA 2017). The aquifers of 
‘the Mountain Aquifer’ – the Western Aquifer, the North-Eastern Aquifer and 
the Eastern Aquifer – share the same predominant geology, mostly karstic 
limestone formations, and derive most of their recharge from rainfall and 
snowmelt within the West Bank (WB 2009: 9). They are characterized by great 
depth with an average of 250 meters (WB 2009: 9). The Western Aquifer, 
flowing from the western slopes of the Palestinian hills toward the coast 
(Figure 1.2), has the highest capacity (362-400 MCM per year) (Figure 1.3) and 
typically high water quality (WB 2009: 9, PWA 2013b: 8). It provides about one 
fifth of Israel’s fresh water, which is pumped from wells located just west of 
the Green Line (WB 2009: 9). The North-Eastern Aquifer and the Eastern 
Aquifer lie almost completely within the West Bank, while the extractions from 




Estimated maximum sustainable yield, water utilization in the West Bank area in 2012 
and water allocation according to the Oslo II Accord of ‘the Mountain Aquifer’ 
 




According to the values in Figure 1.3, the extractions from both the Western 
Aquifer and the Eastern Aquifer exceed the sustainable yields. Furthermore, 
while Palestinian use in 2012 was roughly the amount allocated according to 
the Oslo II Accord or below, Israeli use has significantly exceeded the 
allocated amounts in the case of the Western Aquifer and the Eastern Aquifer. 
Everything considered, Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories4 
(OPT) only have access to 10 % of the available water resources in the region; 
the remaining 90 % is retained by Israel (Koek 2013: 31). 
The focus of this paper is on Jordan Valley, which (including the northern 
Dead Sea span) covers about 30 % of the total area of the West Bank and 
extends from the 1949 Armistice border in the north to the western shore of 
the Dead Sea in the south (Figure 1.4) (Melon 2018: 15, B'Tselem 2017a). In 
the west, it stretches along the eastern slopes of the hills that run through the 
middle of the West Bank (Figure 1.2: B, p.10) while to the east, it borders the 
Jordan River (Hareuveni 2011: 9, HRW 2015: 16). The area’s border with 
Jordan, currently controlled by Israel, is the West Bank’s only international 
land crossing, which plays a significant role for Palestinian movement as well 
as trade with the Middle East and the rest of the world (Melon 2018: 16). From 
the Israeli perspective, the area has been discussed as buffer zone against 
military offensives from the east (Melon 2018: 16). The area’s importance was 
underlined in 2019 by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s plan to annex the 
Jordan Valley after he had announced that loss of Israeli control over the 
Jordan Valley would lead to war (Lazaroff 2019, BBC 2019). 
In 2016, about 65,000 Palestinians, representing approximately 2 % of the 
Palestinian population in the West Bank in that year, lived in the Jordan Valley 
as well as 11,000 Israeli settlers (B'Tselem 2017a, PCBS 2016). Most 
Palestinians in the area, roughly 80 %, reside in Jericho city and communities 
nearby, while the rest live in communities and dozens of small Bedouin5 
villages, most of which are without infrastructure and permanent structures 
(Hareuveni 2011: 9, MA'AN 2010: 28). The settlers live in about 40 settlements 
across the area in violation of international law, that prohibits an occupying 
power to transfer its civilians into the occupied territory6 (HRW 2015: 16, 
ICRC 2018).  
According to the Oslo II Accord, almost 90 % of the Jordan Valley is 
designated as Area C, constituting about 40 % of all Area C which remains 
under full Israeli control (B'Tselem 2017a). On the basis of multiple land 
designations, such as ‘state land’, ‘nature reserves’ and ‘military firing zone’, 
Israel restricts Palestinian land use in Area C (HRW 2015: 19). The remaining 
10 % of the Jordan Valley area are Areas A or B (B'Tselem 2017a). 
 
4 The term ‘Occupied Palestinian Territories’ describes the West Bank (including East 
Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip – those territories that Israel occupied in 1967. 
5 The term describes Arab people who have traditionally inhabited desert regions. 
6 This prohibition is set out in Article 49(6) of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV which 




Map of the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea area, West Bank 
 
Source: after UN 2011, OCHA 2011. 
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Palestinians in Area C of the Jordan Valley live under constant threat of 
home and property demolitions; they face restrictions on building and 
movement and lack access to basic resources like water, education and health 
care services (Jarrar 2018: 9, 14). There is a huge discrepancy between the 
quantity of water allocated to settlers in the Jordan Valley and Palestinians with 
settlers having up to 18 times more water available than Palestinians when 
including water used for agricultural purposes (Hareuveni 2011: 39). While the 
World Health Organization (WHO) recommends a minimum of 
100 liters per capita per day (lpcd) (Howard and Bartram 2003: 1), Palestinians 
living in the West Bank consume 73 lpcd on average compared to 487 lpcd for 
settlers in the Jordan Valley (Isaac and Hilal 2011: 422, 423, Hareuveni 2011: 
37). The Palestinian domestic water consumption in the Jordan Valley differs, 
depending on the area, from less than 20 lpcd to an average of 160 lpcd in the 
Jericho district (Hareuveni 2011: 38). 
The Israeli occupation has also affected the agricultural sector which was 
the mainstay of the economy in the West Bank until 1967 (Graham-Brown 
1990: 57). This situation has changed, among other things, due to lack of 
access to adequate water resources, control of goods and products and 
competition with highly subsidized Israeli produce (MOA 2017: 12, Graham-
Brown 1990: 60, Daoud 2018: 16, 17, Awwad 2016: 543). The ensuing low 
returns from agriculture have forced Palestinians to abandon their land wholly 
or partially and become wage workers in Israeli settlements (Graham-Brown 
1990: 60, HRW 2015: 30). 
In the context of restrictions and disincentives to Palestinian agricultural 
development in the OPT, the sector’s share has declined throughout the years 
of Israeli occupation, being about 20 % of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) in 1996 and 4 % in 2014 (Graham-Brown 1990: 58, Awwad 2016: 545, 
MOA 2017: 10). The amount of agricultural land cultivated by Israeli 
settlements in the West Bank has increased by 35 % from 1997 to 2012 
according to estimates (HRW 2015: 15). Since 2006, the Palestinian agricultural 
sector has witnessed a decline in employment, from about 17 % of total labor 
force in 2006 to about 9 % in 2015 (MOA 2017: 10). The percentage of men 
working in the agricultural sector in 2015 was roughly 8 % of total male 
workers compared to 13 % of total female workers which emphasizes the 
relative importance of the sector to women (MOA 2017: 10). FAO (2011: 11) 
points to the fact that women’s large contribution to Palestinian agriculture is 
rarely recognized as a significant percentage – about 40 % of rural Palestinian 
women at working age – carries out unpaid. According to IFAD (2017: 3), 
“only 1.8 % of women active in the [sector of] agriculture earn a wage”. IFAD 
(2017: 3) further estimates that women only own about 8 % of agricultural 
holdings in the West Bank most of which are small (IFAD 2017: 3). Besides 
that, they often do not control agricultural revenues, providing another reason 
to believe that changes in the agricultural sector may affect men and women 
who engage in agricultural work in different ways (FAO 2018: 2, FAO 2011: 
11). 
The role of agriculture is considered to go beyond being a pillar of 
Palestinian economy. It represents social, historical, and national intangibles:  
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“a direct connection between Palestinians and their land, […] independence, 
selfsufficiency, and Palestinian heritage” (MA'AN 2012: 1). This is also 
reflected in the Palestinian popular proverb “If agriculture is fine, then the 
country is fine” (MOA 2017: 9). Against this background, the Palestinian 
Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) defined the objective of “[enhancing] female 
and male farmers’ resilience and steadfastness on their lands” (MOA 2017: 34), 
especially in Area C in which nearly 63 % of agricultural land in the West Bank 
is located (MOA 2017: 10). This directly addresses Palestinian farmers in the 
Jordan Valley as most of the agricultural land in Area C is located in this area 
(MA'AN 2012: 1). 
1.4 Chapter Outline 
The Research Paper is composed of seven chapters (Figure 1.5). Chapter 2 
explains the methodology that has been adopted. Chapter 3 introduces the 
theory and conceptual framework that supports the analysis performed in the 
subsequent chapters. These chapters aim at answering the posed questions and 




Outline of the Research Paper 
 Chapter 1




















































2  Methodology 
This chapter outlines the feminist standpoint theory which is adopted in the 
research and my own positionality. It then elaborates on the nature of the data 
and the methods in generating it. It also indicates the ethical considerations 
and limitations that result from these choices.  
2.1 Feminist Standpoint Theory 
At the center of the feminist standpoint theory, as elaborated by Sandra 
Harding (1991), is the epistemology (i.e., theory of knowledge) that the 
perspectives of those who are marginalized or oppressed could reveal features 
of dominant institutions which dominant groups often cannot or refuse to see 
(Harding 2015: 36). Starting off from their everyday lives – as it is the intention 
of this research – provides “critical questions about how the social order 
works” (Harding 2005: 226). This may contribute to social justice. According 
to Harding, 
Such a project requires learning to listen attentively to marginalized people; it 
requires educating oneself about their histories, achievements, preferred social 
relations, and hopes for the future; it requires putting one's body on the line for 
‘their’ causes until they feel like ‘our’ causes; it requires critical examination of the 
dominant institutional beliefs and practices that systematically disadvantage them; 
it requires critical self-examination to discover how one unwittingly participates 
in generating disadvantage to them (Harding 2005: 229). 
Critiquing the positivist claim to universal knowledge or the idea that 
science is free of value and interest as well as the traditional standards and 
methods that accompany this claim (Hesse-Biber and Brooks 2007: 8), Harding 
introduces ‘strong objectivity’. Researchers who practice ‘strong objectivity’ 
recognize that their interests, values and agendas inevitably influence every 
stage of the research (Harding 2005: 229). They reject a position of ‘value 
neutrality’ (Hesse-Biber and Brooks 2007: 8) or, in Donna Haraway’s words, 
the ‘God trick’ – “the view from above, from nowhere, from simplicity” 
(Haraway 1988: 589). Instead, they have a clear political and social 
commitment to strengthening the truthfulness and objectivity of knowledge 
claims through reflexivity and self-transparency (Hesse-Biber and Brooks 2007: 
8). In this sense, the standpoint theory is not only an epistemology but also 
offers a methodological basis.  
2.2 Positionality 
Intending to follow Harding’s call for ‘strong reflexivity’ – “the manifestation 
of ‘strong objectivity’ through method” (Hesse-Biber and Brooks 2007: 15), I 
want to disclose the parts of my personal background and viewpoint that 
influence the analysis.  
As environmental engineer with focus on water and as a student of 
development and social justice, I study the problems of water access and the 
lived realities of Palestinians under the occupation, combining my academic 
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expertise with my political commitment to support marginalized and oppressed 
groups in society. Never having been to the OPT before and not speaking 
Arabic (the language spoken by Palestinians), I acknowledge that I am an 
‘outsider’ to the context. However, it is my hope that this research, which 
forms part of my master’s degree, brings attention to and a better 
understanding of some of the struggles that Palestinians are facing. Hence, I 
hope that the study goes beyond “extract[ing] their knowledge for […] [my] 
own personal and professional benefit” (Icaza 2017: 63).  
Influenced by the standpoint theory’s focus on reflexivity and 
transparency as well as constructivist thinking, I share the view that the ways of 
speaking and writing about reality matter as they produce knowledge and, 
thereby, power (Foucault 1976). Furthermore, given the high level of political 
sensitivity surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the fact that there are 
often many terms to describe the same ‘reality’, I agree that “it is necessary to 
abide by the highest standards of accuracy and impartiality […] [and] not to 
uncritically utilize and interiorize terminology” (Le More 2008: 18). Therefore, 
I have tried in this thesis to be aware of possible implications of terminologies. 
In general, I used the international terms from the literature that my work is 
based on and the terms that were used by the respondents or interpreters in 
direct quotes. 
Lastly, I am attaching a pencil drawing (Appendix 1) that I produced as a 
complementary visual means of communicating the results of this research 
from an artistic perspective. 
2.3 Research Methods 
In order to analyze the system of water governance and its impact on the lives 
of Palestinians, this research was guided by different methods and data sources. 
Review of Secondary Data 
At the outset, a thorough review was done on available secondary research and 
statistical material on the subject, providing a clear understanding of relevant 
information on the background of the situation, including statistical data, as 
well as social, economic and political factors involved. This enabled me to 
sharpen my research questions as well as to identify and critically examine 
important analytical concepts, such as water governance, hydro-hegemony and 
forms of access, resilience and resistance. It also deepened my understanding 
of the research area and allowed the development of interview guides for 
different respondent groups to gather empirical data through fieldwork. 
Primary Data Collection 
Between 10 July and 31 July 2019, I then conducted 27 semi-structured face-
to-face interviews in the West Bank to supplement the secondary data with 
primary data which constitute the second set of data. This qualitative method 
was chosen as it provides insights into the ways in which people understand a 
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situation, which is at the core of this research. Starting off from a rich network 
of contacts that my supervisors provided me with, I selected most informants 
based on snowball sampling.  
The interviews were conducted, on the one hand, with fourteen 
informants (thirteen Palestinians and one Dutch) from relevant institutions 
such as the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA), the Ministry of Agriculture 
and organizations that work directly with people in the study area (Appendix 
2). For lack of a better term, I will refer to them as ‘governance informants’. 
On the other hand and in the sense of the standpoint theory (Section 2.1, 
p.16), thirteen interviews were conducted with Palestinian water users who this 
research is about. These people were from different communities in the Jordan 
Valley in the Jericho and Tubas Governorate (Appendix 3 and Appendix 4) 
and mostly they engage in agricultural work. In both groups, 60 % of the 
informants were male, 40 % female. It was crucial for me as a feminist and 
committed to gender justice to include both interview groups and both men 
and women in order to hear a wide range of perspectives on different 
governance levels and also to understand if gender made a significant 
difference in their experiences.  
With the governance informants, I discussed the distribution of water in 
the West Bank (e.g., actors, institutions, regulations), agriculture in the Jordan 
Valley as well as access to water and related challenges and choices (Appendix 
5). Water users were asked about their lifestyles (e.g., daily routine, work at 
home, jobs), what water sources they rely on, how they access water and what 
they use it for as well as related challenges and choices (Appendix 6). Some 
interviews deviated from these rough structures, depending on the 
respondent’s background and preferences.  
The first set of interviews was conducted in English and mostly in the 
confidential environment of the informants’ personal offices. The majority of 
the second set of interviews was conducted in Arabic with English translation 
and, mostly with other family members present. Two of them could be called 
small focus group discussions, given the participation of different informants 
in the conversation and the interaction. Most of the 27 interviews were, under 
permission, recorded and later transcribed. The average duration of the 
interviews was more than one hour.  
The third set of data comprises my observations during fieldwork which I 
have often discussed with my interpreters, who were familiar with the context. 
Besides that, the possibility to ‘view from the body’ (Haraway 1988: 589) 
through the fieldwork was important in order to get a glimpse of what the 
situation may mean for Palestinians in that area – drinking salty, supposedly 
fresh water myself, not being able to take a shower after a day in the heat of 
46 °C, etc. 
Data Triangulation 
The interview transcriptions and notes from fieldwork were then coded, using 
the software Atlas.ti, with a total of 140 codes derived from the data to identify 
common themes (e.g., ‘agriculture: crops’, ‘governance actor: municipality’ or 
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‘water quality: salty’). The triangulation of the data from fieldwork with the 
data from literature was a continuous process going back and forth between 
analyzing the data sets individually and critically comparing them. It implied 
looking thoroughly at what information could be derived from the primary 
data, further narrowing down the focus of this research and identifying what 
knowledge contribution could be made. The combination of different methods 
as well as the use of secondary and primary data at different levels allowed for 
and in-depth analysis of the complex nature of water governance, the 
experiences of insecurity and forms of resilience and resistance of Palestinians 
in the Jordan Valley. 
2.4 Ethics and Limitations 
Throughout all research stages, great importance was placed on upholding 
ethical standards as the paper could bring harm to the people who have been 
involved in the process.  
Prior to the interview conduction, the context of the research and its 
limitations were explained to the informants. It was highlighted that they could 
refuse to answer any question as well as withdraw at any point without 
consequences. They were also asked if they had any questions or anything they 
would like to add. This opportunity was used by many water users to ask me in 
more depth how I think my project will help them. Having replied honestly 
that, in my view, the project could bring some attention to their situation but is 
certainly limited in terms of its scope, no one refused to talk to me, nor did 
anyone seem to be surprised. One man from a community in the Jordan Valley 
replied: 
I know that most problems in this area are hidden. I am happy to see you or 
anyone like you who comes to make the world see the real face of the 
occupation. 
A man from the village of Al-Jiftlik (Figure 1.4, p.13) asked me at the end of 
the interview to add some recommendations to my paper: 
This area needs support to improve the livelihood conditions such as electricity, 
the water network and support for agriculture in general. Another issue is 
education. The students go to a school which is far away […] by feet, so they 
need a bus or there needs to be a bridge to the main street to ensure the safety of 
the students when they cross the street. 
In general, I had the impression that the conversations were well-
appreciated by the respondents who seemed to speak openly about their 
perceptions. The positive and kind attitude, among other things, as it was 
expressed in one of my respondent’s words, “You are welcome, any day, any 
way, any time”, made it easy to connect with the people and build up some sort 
of relationship regardless of language and background-related barriers. 
Working with interpreters has implications for the interview context 
(confidentiality, anonymity, etc.) as well as for the analysis, given the additional 
interpretative factor of translation. Therefore, I carefully considered who to 
work with. Especially, finding a female interpreter proved to be difficult.  
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Eventually, I worked with three different interpreters, two men and one 
woman. They were gatekeepers at the same time who mostly knew the 
informants well and I trusted them with approaching possible respondents. 
They also gave me advice on the appropriateness of questions (e.g., regarding 
income, hygiene), which I followed. 
The fact that they were all Palestinians from the Jordan Valley and not 
from other regions in the West Bank seemed to be important. One of the 
respondents of the small focus group discussion said, “We talk to you 
[addressing my interpreter] because you are not from Ramallah”. When I asked 
my interpreter later, in the presence of her brother, how to understand this, he 
explained, “People feel comfortable when they talk to someone who has the 
same experience. So, whatever they will tell you, you will understand because 
you have the same kind of problems”. He added an Arabic saying that loosely 
translates to: “People who put their hands in fire do not feel the same as 
people who put their hands in ice water”. 
Another ethical concern is the anonymization of the respondents by not 
giving revealing details about them. This decision was taken as, due to practical 
constraints, it was not possible to inform them in which context their words 
have been incorporated in this paper and whether they agree with this 
representation or not. Recognizing the difficult nature of representing others, I 
have decided to include many direct quotes. I hope that the voices of the 
people who this project is about and their actual views break through the 
‘noise of transmission’. 
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3  Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
This chapter presents key concepts that help to frame the analysis and answer 
the questions that guide the research. These concepts, which are considered in 
the analysis from a gender perspective, include water security, water 
governance, hydro-hegemony, everyday resistance, resilience and ‘sumud’. 
3.1 Water Security, Water Governance and 
Hydro-Hegemony 
The Human Development Report (1994) introduced the idea of human 
security to the wider debate on development (UNDP 2006: 3). This meant a 
shift from narrow perceptions of national security (i.e., protection against 
military threats and protection of strategic foreign policy goals) towards 
looking at security rooted in people’s lives (UNDP 2006: 3). Since then, the 
concept of water security as integral part of human security has become 
increasingly influential (UNDP 2006: 3, Empinotti et al. 2019: 48). It broadly 
refers to “ensuring that every person has reliable access to enough safe water at 
an affordable price to lead a healthy, dignified and productive life, while 
maintaining the ecological systems” (UNDP 2006: 3). If these conditions are 
not met, people face human security risks due to poor health and the 
disruption of livelihoods (UNDP 2006: 3).  
A set of parameters, including quantity, quality, accessibility, affordability and 
availability, is embodied in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and has 
been viewed as guiding for the evaluation of water security by the global 
community (UN 2018, Jepson et al. 2017: 47). The parameters, however, are 
designed to assess water security globally and Nganyanyuka et al. (2014: 365) 
stress the importance of using-context specific parameters for understanding 
day-to-day water insecurities experienced by water users. In addition to the 
parameters named above, I add the access dimension safety to my analysis, 
derived from the discussions with water users in the study area, which in the 
context of conflict and occupation also plays a role in accessing water as will be 
shown. 
Jepson et al. (2017: 46) point to the fact that the concept of water security 
remains loosely defined and criticize the dominant focus on water supply 
(Jepson et al. 2017: 50). They propose to define it as:  
[…] a relationship that describes how individuals, households, and communities 
navigate and transform hydro-social relations to access the water that they need 
and in ways that support the sustained development of human capabilities and 
wellbeing in their full breadth and scope (Jepson et al. 2017: 50). 
This conceptualization, that places hydro-social relations at the core of water 
security, implies the engagement of people and institutions in water 
governance “not just as water users but also as political actors” (Empinotti et al. 2019: 
48, emphasis added). 
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The term water governance has indeed become increasingly popular 
within the water security literature (Empinotti et al. 2019: 48). It has been 
acknowledged as a key challenge in achieving long-term sustainability of the 
resource (Franks and Cleaver 2007: 292, Özerol et al. 2018: 43). Despite its 
popularity, there is little consensus regarding the scope and definition of water 
governance (Araral and Wang 2013: 3948). Most definitions refer to “the 
different actors involved and the structures that are required in the formulation 
and implementation of water policies” (Durán-Sánchez et al. 2019: 3). 
Predominantly, there is a focus on normative sets of principles of ‘good’ 
governance (e.g., accountability, transparency, participation, integrity) which 
would lead to ‘good’ outcomes for all (Zwarteveen 2015: 19, Cleaver and 
Hamada 2010: 28). This assumption, however, masks that there is, in fact, little 
understanding of how water governance systems work out in practice in 
specific local contexts and how they impact the lives of individuals (Cleaver 
and Hamada 2010: 28, Franks and Cleaver 2007: 292). The focus on ‘good 
governance’ neglects how power relations and politics can shape governance 
elements that support water security or even how they can contribute to water 
insecurity (Empinotti et al. 2019: 48, Loftus 2015). Furthermore, despite 
considerable evidence that access to water and participation in governance 
institutions are gendered7, much writing on water governance is gender-blind 
(Franks and Cleaver 2007: 296).  
Therefore, Zwarteveen (2015) suggests to make “questions about the 
what, how and why of distribution the very center of the study of water 
governance” (Zwarteveen 2015: 12, 13). This focus allows to contextualize 
water governance in dominant policies and economic trends and to uncover 
political choices that are often hidden in the neo-liberal water policy language 
(Zwarteveen 2015: 12, Ahlers and Zwarteveen 2009: 410, Cleaver and Hamada 
2010: 30). The approach calls for research in “detailed documentation of 
everyday dealings with water, anchoring reflections about water governance in 
everyday water practices” (Zwarteveen et al. 2017: 3). This could contribute to 
reinvigorating the concept’s capacity for challenging power relations and water-
based inequities (Zwarteveen et al. 2017: 3).  
The conceptualization of water governance applied here invites to “trace 
how water that flows to one place carries implications for its quality and 
quantity in other places” (Zwarteveen et al. 2017: 5), uncovering that reality 
often diverges from distributional agreements as set in laws and regulations, 
infrastructural lay-outs and water distribution schedules (Ahlers and 
Zwarteveen 2009: 411, 412). Furthermore, unravelling why some knowledges 
and expertises carry greater authority than others for intervening in water 
distribution reveals broader structures of dominance and injustice (Zwarteveen 
et al. 2017: 7). Lastly, it allows to question how possibilities to control and steer 
the distribution of the resource are organized in specific contexts and on what 
basis (Zwarteveen et al. 2017: 5). This is of particular importance in the context 
of occupation as institutions, spaces and scales for water governance – while 
 
7 The term gender is used in this work to describe socially constructed differences 
between the sexes that produce relationships of power (Scott, J. W. 1986: 1067).  
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being presented as pragmatic policy endeavors – “may serve as a means 
through which to stabilize existing [or aspired] status quos that reflect unequal 
power relations” (Empinotti et al. 2019: 49).  
Recognizing the central role of power relations in transboundary river 
basins, Zeitoun and Warner (2006) introduced the framework of hydro-
hegemony, defined as “hegemony8 at the river basin level, achieved through 
water resources control strategies […] that are enabled by the exploitation of 
existing power asymmetries” (Zeitoun and Warner 2006: 436). Applying 
Gramscian’s hegemony accomplished through relations of coercion and 
consent and Lukes’ (2005 [1974]) three dimensions of power, they suggest 
different forms of power as analytical structure for examining the interplay of 
water, power and conflict (Warner et al. 2017: 9): material power (i.e., economic, 
military, technological, political, financial), bargaining power (i.e., the capability 
of actors to set agendas and control the rules of the game) and ideational power 
(i.e., the capacity of actors to impose and legitimize ideas and narratives) 
(Cascão and Zeitoun 2010: 31, 32). In this work, the concept of hydro-
hegemony is used to investigate power relations that shape the governance of 
‘the Mountain Aquifer’ (Section 1.3, p.11), building on the work of scholars 
who have expanded the concept to transboundary aquifers and following the 
call for more empirical work tied to hydro-hegemony analysis (Warner et al. 
2017: 3, 10). 
The review of the three concepts highlights the significance of politics and 
power relations that lie behind the more neutral formulation of water 
governance and demonstrates that the distribution of and access to water can 
be an outcome of power asymmetries, resulting in inequalities and injustices. 
These notions are used in the analysis of water insecurities experienced by 
Palestinians in the Jordan Valley. 
3.2 Everyday Resistance, Resilience and ‘Sumud’ 
Analytically, the present work also draws on resistance theory, in particular on 
the concept of ‘everyday resistance’, introduced by James Scott (1985). In 
contrast to earlier work on resistance which “focused on large protests, 
movements, and revolutions which confronted their targets directly and 
openly” (Ali 2018: 147), everyday resistance pays attention to how people act in 
ways that challenge dominant power relations in their everyday lives (Ali 2018: 
147). Scott and other scholars like Michel de Certeau and Judith Butler argue 
that “resistance might be hidden or disguised, or a subtle change of everyday 
repetitions” (Lilja and Vinthagen 2018: 213, 214). This is in line with Foucault 
(1990), who argues that power is a plural and ubiquitous relation that 
permeates all aspects of social life and that “points of resistance are present 
everywhere in the power network” (Foucault 1990: 95). According to Richter-
Devroe (2013: 34), it is the perspective of the everyday which can reveal 
structures of dominations and their interrelation. From a feminist perspective, 
 
8 Hegemony can broadly be described as “leadership buttressed by authority” 
(Zeitoun and Warner 2006: 438). 
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the concept of everydayness, exemplified in the work of Michel de Certeau 
(1984), is critical as it is the realm in which women are often most visible 
(Shalhoub-Kerkovian and Busbridge 2014: 88). 
The research also draws on the concept of ‘resilience’ defined as “the 
capacity to positively or successfully adapt to external problems or threats” 
(Chandler 2012: 17). From the 1800s onwards, the concept has passed 
different phases, from initially focusing on individual traits to currently 
understanding it as culturally embedded (Jackson et al. 2007: 2, Marie et al. 
2018: 22, 24). This understanding of cultural embeddedness has brought 
attention to non-Western cultures and the need to investigate resilience in so 
far under-researched contexts (Marie et al. 2018: 24, 25).  
There is also a call for more empirical studies that explore the link 
between ‘resilience’ and ‘sumud’, which roughly translates to steadfastness and 
describes the insistence of many Palestinians on continuing with life despite 
the difficulties they face under occupation (Marie et al. 2018: 29, 31, Ali 2019: 
71). Doubtlessly, part of these struggles is limited access to water. ‘Sumud’ was 
introduced to the discourse in the late 1970s and since then, recommended by 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), it has become a national 
concept and strategy for Palestinians (Marie et al. 2018: 28). Peteet (1991) 
highlights the role of women for defining the concept:  
Women took the concept of sumud and carved a niche for themselves within its 
bounds of meaning. […] The qualities that comprise sumud are also those that are 
characteristic of femininity – silent endurance and sacrifice for others (family and 
community) (Peteet 1991: 153). 
This had paved the way for Palestinians to see their everyday actions as 
politically significant (Peteet 1991: 153). 
Contributing to bridging the gap between the terms ‘sumud’, ‘resilience’ 
and ‘resistance’, I build on Ryan’s (2015) notion of ‘sumud as resilient 
resistance’ and refute conceptualizations that diminish ‘sumud’ and ‘resilience’ 
as ‘passive resistance’ or ‘just coping’ (Ryan 2015: 313). First, using the 
adjective passive is, particularly from a gender perspective, problematic as 
“passivity is a trait traditionally associated with women, in contrast to active 
men” and could be regarded as undesirable characteristic, linked to weakness 
(Ryan 2015: 312). Second, describing Palestinians living under the occupation 
as ‘just coping’ or as ‘living with the occupation’ downplays the effort needed to 
cope or survive. Instead, ‘sumud as resilient resistance’ represents “living despite 
the occupation, or even living to spite the occupation” (Ryan 2015: 313, 
emphasis added). Thus, in addition to adaption, resilient resistance also 
challenges the conditions that are experienced (Ryan 2015: 313). 
Analyzing the situation of the Palestinians with these different lenses will 
allow for a more comprehensive notion of how levels of and controls in water 
governance, politics and power relations, as well as resistance and resilience 
have been embedded in the daily lives of Palestinians in the Jordan Valley. 
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4 Governance for Water Security? 
Water governance in the Palestinian context has been studied before (e.g., 
GWP 2003, WB 2009, UNICEF and GVC 2010, WB 2018). However, this 
chapter relies to a large extent on data generated from fieldwork combined 
with secondary data and it analyzes the main formal structures of water 
governance in the context of the Israeli occupation. It also deals with the 
power relations and hegemonic controls inherent in these structures, which 
influence access to water for Palestinians in the Jordan Valley. Lastly, it 
includes a consideration of internal constraints under occupation and pays 
attention to women’s participation in the water sector. 
4.1 Hegemonic Controls of the Occupation 
Article 40 of the Oslo II Accord allocated to both parties specific quantities of 
the aquifers which underly both the West Bank and Israel (the Jordan River 
being excluded) (Figure 1.2: A, p.10)  – roughly one quarter of the allocations 
to the Palestinians and the rest to Israel and the settlements (WB 2009: iv). It 
also included the formation of the Joint Water Committee (JWC) for the 
management of water-related infrastructure in the West Bank, with equal 
number of Palestinian and Israeli representatives (Messerschmid 2014: 40). 
These arrangements have been criticized harshly as “dressing up domination as 
‘cooperation’” (Selby 2003) or even as “water apartheid” (Glavany 2012). Such 
critiques, suggesting Israel’s hegemonic control of the transboundary 
groundwater resources, are based on evidence of asymmetries regarding 
different forms of power in play (Section 3.1, p.23). These are elaborated 
below. 
The Palestinian side is relatively weaker in terms of material power as the 
arrangements under Oslo only apply to the parts of ‘the Mountain Aquifer’ 
that lie within the West Bank, which means that the PNA does not enjoy 
equivalent veto power in relation to Israel (Messerschmid 2007: 12, Selby 2013: 
7). The fact that this also applies to the decisions made by the JWC, which 
officially have to be reached by consensus, is reflected in the approval rates of 
the JWC, which are significantly lower for Palestinian projects than for Israeli 
projects (Messerschmid 2014: 58, Selby 2013: 11). A research informant from 
the municipality of Jericho highlighted the dependency on the Israeli approval 
for water-related projects, even in Area A: “Without agreement from the Israeli 
side we cannot dig a deep well. […] We asked but till now we have no 
permission. We speak about more than 10 years ago”. Another participant who 
is involved in the JWC (which may prospectively be frozen according to him) 
gave an example of its malfunctioning, further pointing at Israel’s higher 
bargaining power:  
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We had more than one year of negotiation for the prices of the water for the 
extra 32 MCM […]. And in the end, […] they said, ‘This is the price’ and that’s 
it.9 
In addition, the military orders (Section 1.3, p.8) which assigned water 
resources to the control of Israeli military authorities and introduced a permit 
system for water-related installations remain in force (Selby 2003: 135). This 
gives the Israeli Civil Administration power to veto any Palestinian proposal 
even after it has received consent from the JWC – another example of material 
power asymmetries (Selby 2003: 135). Furthermore, given its military presence 
in Areas B and C, Israel can destroy unlicensed infrastructures to enforce 
Palestinian compliance with the Oslo II Accord with the PNA having no 
equivalent means of enforcing Israeli compliance (Selby 2013: 11). Likewise, 
the PNA unlike Israel depends on financial support from international donors 
who insist on full approval by the JWC and the Civil Administration (Selby 
2013: 9). Israel has also geographically the advantage of better pumping 
conditions given that ‘the Mountain aquifer’ mostly drains downstream into 
Israel (Figure 1.2, p.10) (Messerschmid 2007: 3, 8). 
Inseparable from the above, the discourse around water in the West Bank 
is largely influenced by Israel and the Oslo II Accord (i.e., ideational power). 
One of the Palestinian governance informants, for instance, pointed at the 
often-distorted perception of the situation:  
The world outside thinks there is a Palestinian state. This is a shadow 
government. It is not a real government. […] This is something we brought to 
ourselves because of the good faith in the Oslo Accord but it was a trap. […] 
Israel still controls everything. 
Messerschmid (2007: 18, 19) further highlights ‘myths’ deliberately spread by 
Israel (e.g., depicting the West Bank as desert and Israel as responsible state-of-
the-art water manager) that shape people’s views on the water sector. 
These factors have contributed to a reduced “development of water 
resources and services for Palestinian people below levels expected at the time 
of Oslo” (WB 2009: ix). Therefore, Selby (2013: 21) problematizes the concept 
of ‘cooperation’ itself, arguing that ‘cooperation’ under the Oslo II Accord not 
only maintains the status quo ante in the control of transboundary water 
resources, which is in favor of Israel, but has also facilitated Israel’s domination 
of the water resources. 
Reflecting this, the research participants have, without exception, talked 
negatively about the effect of the Oslo II Accord and the occupation in general 
on the water sector. Drawing attention to the gravity of the situation, one of 
the Palestinian governance informants said, 
 
9 This remark refers to a deal between Israel and the PNA according to which Israel 
would sell 32 MCM of water to the PA from Mediterranean desalination plants 
(Ahren and Lidman 2017). 
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We are managing a water crisis. All the time. […] Once we have a final agreement 
with Israel – whether we get enough water or not – at least we know what we 
have. Then we can plan our strategies accordingly. 
For the theorization of hydro-hegemony, the findings suggest the 
concept’s applicability to aquifers and highlight the importance of 
understanding different forms of power as interacting (e.g., ideational power 
influencing material power in terms of financial support by international actors). 
For the theorization of water governance, the case emphasizes the importance 
to look beyond laws and regulations (Section 3.1, p.22). 
4.2 Governance in a Scattered Palestinian Water Sector 
The Palestinian water sector “features a fragmented and heterogeneous make-
up” (WB 2009: 15) due to a large number of actors as well as unclear mandates 
and responsibilities (Appendix 7). Against this background, a reform process 
was initiated, which led to the endorsement of the 2014 Water Law that 
includes roles and relations among the various institutions (Appendix 8) (GWP 
2015: 17, 18). Currently, however, the sector is “in an undefined period of 
transition as structures and responsibilities are being shifted” (GWP 2015: 5). 
A Palestinian governance informant explained, 
Water governance in Palestine is very scattered because of the history and 
because of the political situation. […] Some service providers10 are still working 
according to the Jordanian law. […] There is no connection between the service 
providers and the higher level of water governance because most of the service 
providers are municipalities and they belong to the Ministry of Local 
Government, not to the Palestinian Water Authority [(PWA)]. […] Our 
agricultural water is private […]. This is because people inherited water use since 
the Turkish mandate. 
Another informant mentioned problems among the newly established Water 
Sector Regulatory Council (WSRC) and the PWA “because, obviously, it is 
about roles and mandates and control and power”.  
The problems in the Palestinian water sector were often explained in 
connection with the occupation, as a result of the lack of water access – 
“Everybody is competing for a very limited quantity” or “What do you expect 
from the PWA if they can’t control their own national water resources? So 
basically, you expect a bird to fly but you cut off its wings”. However, 
Palestinian actors were also blamed, mainly by the governance informants. 
One, for instance, said, 
For the part of the governance the Palestinians do control, they should be far 
more willing to proceed in reform processes […]. Municipalities who collect 
water revenues use these bills to build new roads or do things completely not 
related to water. […] Either use the revenues that you have collected and leave 
me [PWA] out or give everything to me and I take care of it. […] [However,] the 
 
10 According to two informants, there are currently more than 300 different service 
providers in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
28 
 
ministry of finance also withholds tax revenues from municipalities, so then 
municipalities take the revenues that they have in house to pay for the services. 
Most criticism directed at the PNA was related to the distribution of financial 
resources or the lack of priority given to Area C and the Jordan Valley. Several 
informants gave the example that less than 1 % of the total budget of the PNA 
is allocated to the Ministry of Agriculture, which they suggested should be 
increased (MOA 2017: 17, EC 2017: 169). Other suggestions are listed in 
Appendix 9. 
Gender and Water Governance 
Examining which knowledges and expertises carry authority for intervening in 
the distribution of water (Section 3.1, p.22) brings us to the participation of 
women in the water sector. With a hint of sarcasm, one of the female 
governance informants summarized: “The water is controlled by Israelis and 
after the Israelis it is controlled by men. Then it comes to the women”.  
According to Carmi et al. (2019: 335), women make up 30 % of the staff 
at the PWA, while holding around 37 % of decision-making positions. Carmi 
et al. (2019: 335) found two main factors that contribute to this unbalanced 
male-female ratio, namely a patriarchal society11 as well as a strong negative 
perception of female decision makers. The struggles resulting from social 
norms and gendered perceptions were also expressed by one of the male 
respondents from the PWA: 
We are trying to do our best to involve women in decision-making, but to be 
honest, […] the water sector is not like any other sector […] because there are a 
lot of tasks that women cannot be engaged in. […] We cannot send a woman to 
work night shifts at a pumping station […]. It is difficult. It is even socially not 
accepted to have a woman working during night. Even physically it is not 
possible for women to work on maintenance of sewage networks which needs 
extra physical power. They cannot, for instance, open a manhole of 30 kilograms 
on the street. So ok, we all agree that women’s participation is very important, 
but in their position. They should be respected as women. Sending a woman to 
work on anything that is socially not acceptable is non-respect for the woman. 
In water provision utilities, the number of female staff is with about 8 % 
even lower (GWP 2015: 52). Underpinning such statistics, one of my 
informants shared that there are currently 50 men and only 2 women working 
at the water and sewage department of the municipality of Jericho. 
Contradicting the previous informant regarding women’s capacities to some 
extent, he explained, 
Some women now work on installing the pipes, irrigation networks and 
maintenance of the pumping stations. It is possible. I believe nothing can prevent 
 
11 The term describes a society that “consists of a male-dominated power structure 




this. Maybe we need time because […] we need to change the culture and to 
persuade the people that women have the capacity to do this work. 
It was argued that, among other things, due to the fact that a lot of the 
water-related work at the ground level is undertaken by women, it is imperative 
to involve them in water management decision processes (Carmi et al. 2019: 
339). Other reasons were given by one of the female governance informants:  
It is important to mainstream women in the sector from the point of view of the 
right to work. There are large numbers of well-educated female engineers12 and 
they are willing to work in the water sector. It is important to involve them and 
to encourage men to accept them. Male managers sometimes reject female 
employees. They think she cannot go to the field […]. I think water is […] a vital 
issue. If you are not involved in this, I don’t think you can be involved in 
anything. 
She added that a lot could be gained from learning from the public regarding 
water issues, especially from women who “are the key in water management at 
the household level”. 
Approaches towards tackling this issue can be found in the Water Sector 
Reform Plan (2014 - 2016), which prescribes that recruitment and promotion 
systems should be “based on merit and a related performance evaluation” 
(PWA 2013a: 15). The PWA has, furthermore, as part of a so-called ‘Gender 
Strategy’ expressed a “strong belief in the leading role of women and working 
diligently to be gender-sensitive in all activities” (PWA 2016: 13). 
The findings show that water governance is not a neutral concept as it is 
sometimes portrayed, but is reflective of power relations, for instance, based 
on occupational domination and gender differences. The impacts of this on 
water security of Palestinians in the Jordan Valley are analyzed in the following 
chapter. 
 
12 The chief executive officer of the WSRC stated that the proportion of women in 
water and environment master programs at universities was 64 %, while only 6 % of 
the jobs in this sector were occupied by women (Hmaidi 2019). 
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5  Water Insecurities of  Palestinians in the Jordan Valley 
This chapter, which is largely based on data from fieldwork, analyses how the 
controls in water governance affect the daily lives of Palestinians in the Jordan 
Valley. It provides an overview of the types of water sources Palestinians rely 
on as well as related access problems. It then highlights the water related 
hardships that women face as both informant groups indicated that women 
suffered more than men from the situation. As in the previous chapter, 
attention is given to the voices of the people and their understanding of the 
situation. 
5.1 Types of Water Sources 
With no access to the Jordan River (Section 1.3, p.11), Palestinian water users 
from different regions in the Jordan Valley (Appendix 3) rely on water from a 
network operated by Israel’s national water company Mekorot as well as from 
Palestinian springs and wells, some of which are owned privately. As this 
section highlights, political decisions on infrastructure and distribution have 
resulted in water insecurities for Palestinians in the area. 
The Palestinians largely depend on groundwater pumped and allocated by 
Mekorot (Melon 2018: 63). However, many smaller villages, especially Bedouin 
communities, are not served by any network. A man from a Bedouin 
community told us, “The Mekorot pipes run under our tents but we can’t use 
the water from them”. One of the governance informants explained that while 
connecting many of these communities to the Mekorot network was 
technically easy, there were political reasons for not doing it: “Israelis don’t 
build these pipes because if they did, that would mean that they recognize 
Palestinian existence in this area”. 
Besides that, there are about 90 active wells in the area, mainly operating 
for agricultural use; prior to 1967 there were more than 200 (Hareuveni 2011: 
32). Most of them have a depth from dozens of meters to 200 meters, which is 
in contrast with Israeli wells that go down hundreds of meters (Hareuveni 
2011: 32). For the past decades, pumping from the wells has decreased or even 
ceased because of Mekorot drillings nearby (Hareuveni 2011: 33). This has also 
negatively affected the water quality. Attempts to increase the depth of the 
wells to regain access to the groundwater are usually either denied permission 
by the JWC or given permission but in restricted ways (Section 4.1, p.25). A 
farmer from the village Al-Auja told me, 
The first well in this village was dug in 1954. My father dug it. The depth of it 
was 40 meters only. At that time, they reached the water at the level of 17 meters. 
In 2011, I lost all the water from the well. It was sweet water, good water. From 
2011 until 2015, I waited to receive a permission from the Israelis to dig deeper. I 
received permission to dig until 84 meters. When I dug, the water was salty. 
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Mekorot drillings as well as little precipitation in the past years, 
furthermore, led to a significant decline in the amount of water withdrawn 
from springs. Al-Auja Spring was given as an example by several of the 
informants. One of them explained, 
In Al-Auja, the water came from the natural spring. There is an open canal. This 
water went to farming. In the past, eight to ten farmers who had private 
ownership of the water benefitted from it. […] Then Israelis dug three wells 
close to the spring and the spring got dry. So, the families that didn’t have wells, 
didn’t have any water resources left. Al-Auja used to be known for banana 
cultivation. Now, it’s empty like a desert.13 
The fact that during my stay, there was water flowing in the canal from Al-Auja 
Spring was explained by one of the governance informants by reparations that 
had been done recently at the close by Mekorot pumping station (Figure 5.1). 
One of the water users explained that, while there is usually only water from 




Left: Fenced Mekorot pumping station in Al-Auja;  
Right: Canal of Al-Auja Spring (July 2019) 
 
An example of a network operated by the Palestinian side can be found in 
the city of Jericho (Area A). Here, water users mainly depend on Sultan Spring 
of which 42 % is used for domestic purposes and 58 % for agricultural 
purposes according to an informant from the Jericho Municipality. From the 
main source, the water for domestic purposes is pumped to tanks and from 
 
13 Another informant explained, “In this village, we used to cultivate more than 
7000 dunums of banana and 2000 dunums of citrus fruit. Now you find just some 
banana trees around the houses”.  
32 
 
there distributed by gravity. There is a separate network for agricultural use. 
This share of water is owned by Palestinians.  
5.2 Water Insecurities according to Dimensions of Access  
Six dimensions of access were identified on the basis of the discussions with 
water users, namely (a.) water quantity, (b.) water quality, (c.) the distance of the 
source and the time it takes to collect the water, (d.) the affordability and the price 
of the water, (e.) the availability and reliability (i.e., How frequent and how 
certain is the access to the water?) as well as (f.) safety (i.e., How safe is the 
access?). Overall, the data shows significant variations regarding water access 
across spatial, temporal and socio-economic boundaries. This was mostly 
pronounced between planned areas in which piped water is theoretically 
available, and unplanned areas, mainly Bedouin villages, in which it is not 
(Section 5.1, p.30).  
a. Quantity 
Large variations regarding the water consumed by Palestinians in the Jordan 
Valley have been mentioned earlier (Section 1.3, p.14). Supporting such 
statistics, a man from the village Al-Jiftlik, for instance, said that twice per 
week his family of nine people filled two plastic tanks (1500 liters per tank) 
with water supplied by Mekorot for domestic use. This makes roughly 95 lpcd.  
Many informants highlighted that the quantity of the water provided by 
Mekorot was insufficient to cover their domestic needs. An informant from 
the refugee camp Aqbat Jaber which is connected to the Mekorot network 
stated, “They give us the quantity they want to give us and not how much we 
need”. This was a problem especially in summer when due to high 
temperatures domestic needs were higher and at the same time, the possibilities 
to fall back on alternative resources (e.g., spring water) were limited. The 
relation between climatic conditions and water needs was also highlighted by 
an informant, who explained that the air conditioners which he used depended 
on water – “Each of them needs about 200 liters of water per day” – and that 
they therefore competed with other domestic water needs. Many farmers, like 
the one from Al-Auja quoted in the previous section (p.30), also face problems 
due to reduced quantities of agricultural water from wells and springs. 
Quantities were expressed in different ways, depending on the type of 
source and the way in which the water is handled. For instance, people from 
Bedouin communities who rely on water trucking expressed their consumption 
in number of tanks filled per day or week (Figure 5.2). Others, when being 
asked about how much water they used, answered in hours or times per time 
period in which they are supplied with water from a network. One informant 
from the village Al-Jiftlik with 4 dunums14 of greenhouses and 28 dunums of 
urban field cultivations said, 
 
14 Dunam is the commonly used measurement unit for land in the OPT (1 dunum is 
about 0.1 hectare). 
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The issue here is that people pay in hours not in cubic meters. For all my land, I 
have 12 hours every 3 days, with about 30 cubic meters per hour from a well. 
Two informants who work on land that they, like other families in the 
neighborhood, rent from an owner from Ramallah explained that he had 
divided the access to the water from his well among the tenants: 
The owner decides how much water each family gets for days. Some have 20 
hours, others 27 or 30 hours. We, for instance, rent 50 dunums which we have 
divided into different areas where each area gets about 7 hours of water. 
Sometimes we have to get up at 1 am in the morning to change where the water 
goes to. 
Thus, in this case, the time of (e.) availability plays an important role in the 
context of (a.) water quantity. This calls for using parameters for assessing water 
access that are adjusted to the local conditions (Section 3.1, p.21). It also shows 
the interdependence of access dimensions on the ground, which can hardly be 
categorized separately. To give an example, if people did not have to drive 
many hours per day to fill their water tanks (i.e., reduced (c.) collection time), they 
might have money from reduced fuel costs (i.e., reduced (d.) prices) to buy 
another tank to store water in (i.e., increased (e.) reliability). 
 
Figure 5.2 
Truck with water tank of three cubic meters (July 2019) 
 
b. Quality 
Overall, the quality of the water supplied by Mekorot as well as from springs 
was considered good while the water from the wells was described as salty – 
unusable for domestic purposes and restrictedly suitable for agricultural 
purposes. An informant from the PWA said that besides the high salinity of 
the water of the agricultural wells, there were also problems with turbidity and 
total dissolved solids (TDS).  
The only significant complaints regarding the quality of the Mekorot water 
were made in Aqbat Jaber where the water is salty. A woman from the camp 
said, “Even the animals have been sick from this water. What about us?”. 
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In addition, other factors that influence the quality and safety of the water 
were named. For instance, a man from a Bedouin village said that he filled the 
tank of his truck with fresh water; but once he filled this water into small tanks 
to store it, it became contaminated – “Sometimes my small children drink from 
that water and become sick”.  
c. Distance and Collection Time 
The distance to the water source and the collection time played a role for water 
users whose households are not connected to a network as well as for 
connected households.  
One family from Fasayil, for instance, said that they were the only family 
in the village with continuous water supply from the Mekorot network, while 
the other households were supplied for only about ten hours per day. The 
father explained, “Our house is close to the main pipe. The location is good”.  
Many informants also drew a connection between the distance from the 
water source and the price of the water. A woman from Aqbat Jaber explained 
that due to the lack of water and the salinity of the Mekorot water, they would 
regularly call a man who would bring water from Sultan Spring in Jericho: 
We pay about 30 shekels15 for 1.5 cubic meters when he brings the water also for 
other families. If he only fills our tank, then he asks for maybe 50 or 60 shekels 
because he must come all the way just for us. 
A man from a Bedouin community explained that he collected water from 
different farmers who gave their surplus for free. The ‘searching for water’, 
however, would take him about three hours every three days in winter; in 
summer often every two days. It could even take him up to a full day, he said. 
Another informant who fills the tank on his truck twice per day said that it 
took him up to 4 hours in total – each time about 1.5 hours for getting from 
the source to the destination because the road was bad, which meant that he 
had to go carefully with the full tank, and 20 minutes to go back. 
Yet another man from a Bedouin community mentioned that, while his 
main source was about one kilometer away and the water there was for free for 
him, he sometimes preferred to go nine kilometers to Sultan Spring where he 
buys the water because “sometimes there are too many people at the main 
source and I would have to wait for maybe one hour”. 
d. Price and Affordability 
Prices of water differ from one locality to another. Two factors determining 
them are the costs of the electricity needed for pumping the water up from the 
deep aquifer and distributing it as well as the costs of the fuel to transport 
water. Informants indicated that other factors like ownership of water 
resources and relations to the Israeli Civil Administration were also important. 
 




The municipality of Jericho has implemented a water tariff system with 
two categories, namely domestic use and commercial use, and for each 
category different price levels that depend on the amount of water taken. The 
range is between 1 shekel and 10 shekels per cubic meter. Farmers who take 
their owned shares from Sultan Spring only pay 0.36 shekel per cubic meter for 
the pumping of the water.  
A woman from Aqbat Jaber said that she had used to pay 100 shekels for 
three months to the so-called Popular Committee (PC), which represents the 
camp residents. The PC then paid Mekorot for the water supply. However, due 
to insufficient service, she had stopped paying – “If you want us to pay, you 
need to give us the services that we pay for”. In fact, most people said that 
they were not paying for the Mekorot water anymore (Section 6.1, p.42). 
For the water shares from agricultural wells owned by Palestinians, the 
prices depend on the deal that is made between the users and the owner 
(Section 6.1, p. 42). A man from a Bedouin village, whose income stems from 
livestock, drew attention to the cost factor of the fuel he needs for trucking: 
I pay 20 shekels for one tank of 3 cubic meters to the owner of the well and 
about 60 shekels on top for the fuel to transport the water. […] There is a period 
in the year where there is no milk from the sheep because of pregnancy. In this 
time, we don’t get money, but we have to pay […]. It is a lot of money that we 
must pay for water every day. 
While most informants did not regard affordability as a main issue, some 
highlighted the socio-economic status mattered. A woman from a community 
close to Jericho, where the municipality collects 100 shekels per month for the 
water supply, said that some people who did not have this money would not 
get water until they paid. Two women from Aqbat Jaber added, “Not all 
people have the money to buy the good water from Sultan Spring.” and “It’s 
all about money. If you have a lot, you can get all you want”. Sharing his 
perceptions regarding class structure in this context, one governance informant 
explained,  
We have been occupied by many […]. During these eras, there have always been 
families with good relations to the occupying government. So, some families 
have control or power from the past. […] The majority of the people in the 
Jordan Valley are the same class, more or less. But there are families […] that buy 
the land from the poor. […] For them, it’s a business. […] These Palestinian 
families go to the Israeli Civil Administration to dig a well or rehabilitate it and 
they have permissions quickly […]. If you have a lot of money you can facilitate 
the process. 
e. Availability and Reliability 
Many issues that fall under this dimension have been touched upon before 
(e.g., having limited access hours, relying on uncertain water surpluses from 
others, having to wait at a filling point).  
In addition, an informant from the municipality of Jericho said that in 
summer, due to shortage of water, they had divided the supplied area and were 
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using an intermittent program in which each area would be supplied for 8 to 9 
hours per day. A woman from Aqbat Jaber said that the water was currently 
coming once per week with some uncertainty – “I know it will come today or 
tomorrow […] because since last Thursday it has not come”. Two other 
informants from the camp agreed that the situation had been likewise bad 
from about ten years ago until three years ago when they stared to have better 
supply until now. In general, many participants highlighted that the situation 
was better in winter.  
Another factor is the link between electricity and the access to water. As 
the pressure is weak, many households use pumps to improve the transport of 
the network water. A family who lives on a small hill in Al-Jiftlik said that the 
pressure was not enough to reach their home. Therefore, they were using their 
own pump but “if the water comes, the electricity is cut off and when the 
electricity comes, the water is cut off and to pump the water you need the 
electricity”. 
f. Safety 
In a context of conflict and occupation, safety in accessing water cannot be 
taken for granted which is why safety risks (e.g., from building and movement 
restrictions) should be considered for analyzing water security. As mentioned 
before, property is destroyed by Israeli soldiers on a daily basis (Section 1.3, 
p.14) which includes water-related systems like water tanks. Furthermore, some 
strategies that people use in response to insufficient access (Section 6.1, Table 
6.1, p.40), like illegal tapping from the Mekorot pipes, are strictly panelized. 
An example of how safety and reliability of water access are related was 
given by a man from a Bedouin community, who told us that he had been 
arrested several times by the Israeli military for unknowingly letting his sheep 
graze on land which had been closed off – “There are no borders. Only by 
experience you learn where […]  you can’t go”. One time, he said, he had been 
in the mountains with his son and sheep when an army jeep had arrived, and 
he had been arrested for several hours. “Had it not been for my son, my wife 
would not have known where I was and the sheep might have gone to the 
military camp or been stolen by settlers”, he said. It was the same man who 
said that collecting water took him up to a full day, which means that arrest can 
also have severe consequences for water access.  
The discussion on access to water for Palestinians in the Jordan Valley 
shows that the governance structures, analyzed in the previous chapter, have 
resulted in severe daily water insecurities of different types which are often 
interactional and cumulative. 
5.3 Women’s Burdens in the Face of Water Insecurities 
Jarrar (2018: 6) argues that due to  
[…] their multi-faceted productive, reproductive, and community-managing roles 
[…], women in the Jordan Valley are more vulnerable to the impacts of Israel’s 
unlawful measures in the region, which have had direct adverse impacts on their 
37 
 
standard of living and on the various roles and responsibilities they undertake 
[…]. 
This, however, according to Jarrar (2018: 28), has not been adequately 
addressed yet. A report by the UN (2018: 30), furthermore, emphasizes that 
most documents and publications related to gender analysis in the OPT pay 
little attention to water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH). 
Many informants of this research highlighted that both “women and men 
are targeted by Israelis and they are living in the same conditions, which are 
[…] bad and very primitive” and that “women and girls are not a target group 
on their own”. However, there are specific repercussions that effect women 
and girls differently in comparison to men and boys. This was also brought up 
by one of the male governance informants who clarified, 
So, when Israel distributes the water, it goes to the village. The village distributes 
the water to the houses. There is an unequal distribution but not on the basis of 
gender. But, of course, the women will be more affected. Why? […] The women 
are doing the homework, the women are doing a lot of the work in the farms, the 
women have to take care of everything. 
Putting these words in concrete terms, a man from a Bedouin community, 
not asked about any numbers, said 
In percentages, I face about 8 % of the problems with the water; 92 % is faced by 
my wife […] because she needs more water. […] I only go to the mountains 
[with the sheep]. She gets up at 4 am in the morning; she starts making milk, 
cheese and yoghurt. Then she starts making breakfast. […] After that she starts 
to clean, wash the clothes, shower the children and then to make lunch for me 
and my children. […] In the evening, she helps me to put food for the animals. 
All day she is like a machine. She works from 4 am in the morning until 
midnight. 
A male governance informant highlighted the special role of water in the 
context of the Jordan Valley compared to more urbanized areas as well as that 
socially constructed differences start from an early age: 
The land is very salty, so we have always problems in the houses. Also, because 
the material from which they are built are very cheap. So, they get dirty [easily]. 
[…] If there is any water on the streets, this will make mud. And then the kids 
will enter the house […]. And she has to clean […]. The lucky woman who has a 
younger daughter because also the girls help with the homework. 
Other informants pointed at the productive roles of women, explaining 
that agriculture is traditionally family work in the Palestinian context (Section 
1.3, p.14). While one female water user and her daughter who both work in 
agriculture said that there was traditionally an equal division of work – “men 
and women do the same in farming” – others highlighted that the tasks were 
gendered. Explaining this, one of my informants said that the division of tasks 
would depend on whether it is the formal or informal level of the agricultural 
sector – “the formal level is mostly dominated by men because those are large 
businesses and that is where the money is”. To give an example, one man from 
the Jordan Valley explained,  
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In the Jordan Valley, […] more than 80 % of the farming duties are done by 
women […]. The jobs that need the use of vehicles, like tractors and trucks, are 
the jobs of the men, so is the preparation of the land before cropping, because it 
needs […] huge equipment […]. At the time they have prepared the land […], 
women start their work. Women are seeding, they follow up the arrangements of 
the plants. They do after that everything or most of the things. And the men just 
take the crops to the markets to sell them. 
He added, “This is the culture. […] This is the tradition; we keep following it 
and there is very little change”. 
Such explanations also matched my observations. In one interview with a 
man from a community in the Jordan Valley, for instance, that started with 
both men and women, the women left at some point – from what I could 
observe – to fulfil other tasks (e.g., to bring drinks, to go to the animals), while 
most men stayed. Without any question from my side related to this, the 
informant said, with a hint of sarcasm, “And you know, while the men are 
talking here, the women are feeding the animals. This is the world of the men”. 
One of the female water users explained how both women and men maintain 
traditional gender roles: 
Even if my son was at home, I would be the one who would bring the water 
because we [my husband and I] taught them from when they were young that the 
mum must do everything. I taught them. This is how we grow up, our culture. 
In addition to women’s roles in tasks which necessitate water (e.g., 
cleaning, cooking, bathing children, gardening), several informants also pointed 
out that women individually needed more water in the Palestinian context. This 
was explained on the basis of traditions (e.g., women having traditionally long 
hair and wearing more clothes) as well as physiology (e.g., special needs during 
the menstrual cycle or pregnancy). Indicating that this is often not talked about 
openly, one of the male water users said, “I cannot tell you all the details but 
there are more needs for women than for men”. 
As discussed in one of the small focus groups, among others with a doctor 
from a health clinic in  Al-Jiftlik, the  situation  effects  both  men  and  women 
negatively regarding their health (e.g., diseases like amoeba due to 
contaminated water) and their social and psychological well-being, however, to 
a larger extent women. One of the male participants explained, 
You can imagine the situation with twelve members in the house without water. 
It will affect them psychologically and will cause conflicts. […] The woman is the 
main root in the house. […] Everything is connected to her. If there is no water 
– ‘You are responsible!’ […] So, she is the blame taker in the house. 
Another participant added, 
If there is no water, […] for the women, it is something serious and critical, 
especially […] [for] the young girls at school. When she starts to have her 
menstrual cycle, she needs the water. It is related to her psychological status if 
there is [none] […]. Sometimes she goes with a dirty body, with dirty clothes and 
she feels uncomfortable for the smell and everything. 
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While awareness regarding gendered impacts was high among all 
informants, relatively few of them mentioned possibilities of changing roles in 
order to reduce some of women’s burdens. Some informants, however, 
expressed that it was necessary to change current structures, among other 
things, because the right to water was a human right which, thus, included 
women. Initiatives for changing traditional roles are also reflected in one of the 
identified strategies of resilient resistance, namely raising awareness (Section 6.1, 
p.44).  
The discussion shows that the identified water insecurities faced by 
Palestinians in the Jordan Valley have implications for their health, safety and 
livelihood. Due to their productive and reproductive roles as well as higher 
physiological water needs, women and girls are affected to an even larger 
extent than men and boys. 
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6  Resilient Resistance in the Face of  Water Insecurities 
In the face of water insecurities, Palestinians in the Jordan Valley have adopted 
practical, ideological and political strategies to survive under the conditions. 
This chapter, mostly based on primary data, analyzes strategies undertaken to 
improve access to water, if and how these are gendered, and how they have 
been supported and promoted by resilience and resistance, including the 
notion of ‘sumud’ (steadfastness). 
6.1 Strategies for Improving Access to Water 
People have responded in different ways to water insecurities. From the 
primary data, 18 strategies have been identified which are listed in Table 6.1 
including an indication of which dimensions of access they possibly address. 
 
Table 6.1 
Indicative assessment of positive effects of identified strategies  
on different dimensions of access 







































































1.   Storing water in tanks or ponds ●  ● ● ● ● 
2.   Using pumps to increase the pressure of the water from 
a network 
●    ● ● 
3.   Using filters to improve the water quality  ●     
4.   Buying water from additional sources (e.g., wells, 
springs, supermarket) 
● ●   ●  
5.   Sharing water sources or services    ●   
6.   Collecting water from other people’s surpluses ● ● ● ●   
7.   Asking for permission to deepen or rehabilitate wells ● ● ● ● ● ● 
8.   Tapping pipes ● ● ● ● ●  
9.   Refusing to pay for water    ●   
10. Using different types of water for different purposes ●   ●  ● 
11. Being careful with handling water ●  ● ● ● ● 
12. Reducing domestic water consumption ●  ● ● ● ● 
13. Changing crop or livestock production (e.g., growing 
dates, reducing area) 
●  ● ● ● ● 
14. Having additional jobs (e.g., one family member 
working in a settlement) 
   ●   
15. Having special arrangements with land and well owners ● ● ● ● ● ● 
16. Moving within the Jordan Valley or leaving the area ● ● ● ● ● ● 
17. Protesting on the streets ● ● ● ● ●  
18. Raising awareness internally, nationally and 
internationally 





As visible from the table, one strategy can cater for problems in several 
dimensions of access at the same time. It should be noted that the list is 
indicative and not exhaustive and that no quantitative conclusions can be 
drawn from it. Overall, the strategies are employed on an individual, household 
or community basis. The strategies (2) Using pumps to increase the pressure of the 
water from a network, (5) Sharing water sources or services, (6) Collecting water from other 
people’s surpluses and (7) Asking for permission to deepen or rehabilitate wells have 
already been introduced in the previous chapter. The remaining strategies are 
explained according to one of the dimensions of access they address.  
People usually use an array of these strategies. This is captured in the 
quote of a man from the village Al-Auja which includes two different 
strategies, namely (13) Changing crop or livestock production and (14) Having 
additional jobs: 
When we changed our way of cultivating here, I did many things. First, I worked 
as an individual in Jericho and my wife used to cover the farm […]. It was very 
difficult. After that I started with livestock – with the sheep and goats. My wife 
knows much about bees, so we started keeping bees. […] The money from the 
honey we used for the sheep and my wife started making cheese and yoghurt 
[…]. Now I have about 100 heads of sheep and goats, and horses, chicken also 
for eggs […] and I cultivate about 40 dunums of dates […] because they can 
tolerate the bad quality of the water. 
a. Improving Access: Quantity 
A common strategy is (1) Storing water in tanks or ponds (Figure 6.1), both applied 
by water users in areas connected to a network and in those not connected. A 
woman from Aqbat Jaber (connected to the Mekorot network), for instance, 
said that as the water was only coming about one day per week. During these 
hours, they filled their tank on the rooftop. Besides, to make maximum use of 
the water, she opened the taps when she expected it – “The water comes with 
a sound like ‘shshshsh’. I am very happy when I hear that sound”. This is one 
example of strategy (11) Being careful with handling water.  
Another strategy is (12) Reducing domestic water consumption. A man from a 
Bedouin village said, “My children need a shower everyday but maybe they can 
take one every second or third day”. Reducing the consumption of water with 
good quality is also accomplished by (10) Using different types of water for different 
purposes. For instance, a woman from Aqbat Jaber said that she used the salty 
Mekorot water for watering plants, cleaning, washing and cooking, while 
buying bottled water for drinking.  
Lastly, an informant from Al-Jiftlik told us that Israelis – who we could 
observe from the place where we were sitting – were checking the Mekorot 
pipes to find out if anyone was illegally (8) Tapping pipes. Another informant 
said that “Israel started to make some military interventions to stop illegal 
connections”, with people being arrested and paying penalties. Only one water 
user mentioned that he had used to take water from before the water counter, 





Water tanks of one cubic meter each  
(left: in a garden; right: on the rooftop of a house - July 2019) 
 
b. Improving Access: Quality 
Besides other strategies of water quality improvement, such as (4) Buying water 
from additional sources (e.g., bottled water from a supermarket for drinking), one 
that has not been named yet is (3) Using filters to improve the water quality. A family 
from Fasayil said that they used filters which they cleaned regularly, and which 
improved the quality of the network water. 
c. Improving Access: Distance and Collection Time 
Strategies for enhancing access regarding this dimension are (15) Having special 
arrangements with land and well owners and (16) Moving within the Jordan Valley or 
leaving the area. An example was given by a family, currently living on a farm 
close to Jericho, that originally comes from the Tubas governorate. They 
explained that they had moved several times, always staying at one rented place 
until their well ran dry or the water quality was insufficient. Currently, they 
said, they had a renting arrangement with the owner of the land, the house and 
the well from which they used water for agriculture. They are living there for 
free and do not pay for the water. However, all agricultural incomes are shared 
equally between them and the owner. A family from Al-Jiftlik told me they had 
a similar arrangement in which “all the inputs and all the outputs are shared 
fifty-fifty” between them and the landowner. 
d. Improving Access: Price and Affordability 
Affordability being a minor issue, two lines of reasoning were given for (9) 
Refusing to pay for water. First, people said they were unwilling to pay for 
insufficient services. Second, people explained that the former Palestinians 
Yasser Arafat had given them the order to stop paying – “If we leave the land, 
the Israelis would take it, so they needed people to stay here. It was an 
incentive for people to stay”. Other reasons were added by an informant from 
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the PWA. Somewhat contrary to the findings from interviews with the users 
who said that access to sufficient quantities of water was a main challenge, he 
said, 
The quantity is actually ok. This is not the main issue that people are not paying. 
Not paying for water started to be like a culture in Palestine. They consider water 
as from God. So, they think, ‘How could we pay for something that we can use 
from God?’. On the other hand, they say, ‘Ok, give us the authority to drill our 
own wells. Then we will not take any water from others’. They feel like they are 
asked to pay for something that is not fair. 
Another PWA informant explained that the collection rates of the West 
Bank Water Department (WBWD), responsible for paying the Mekorot bills, 
varied across areas and that it was low in the Jordan Valley, 
In several cases, the collection rate is less than 40 % on average […]. In Area A it 
is about 80 or 90 % because there is some enforcement and more affordability 
but in rural areas it is less. 
While some water users considered it an act of resistance against the 
occupation, the governance informants rejected this strategy, among other 
things, as Israel deducts the amounts due for unpaid Mekorot bills from the 
taxes it collects on behalf of the PNA (WB 2018: 79). These deductions are 
considerably higher than the calculations made by the Palestinian side (WB 
2018: 79). One of the informants explained that Palestinians who tap Israeli 
pipes or refuse to pay the Mekorot bills 
think they have access to water and simultaneously they do damage to Israel. […] 
They are not aware that the PNA is actually paying for it, so there is no 
understanding that they are shooting themselves in the foot. […] Or maybe, 
because Area C is often completely overlooked, they don’t care. 
Another governance informant shared that many farmers who are renting land 
do not even benefit from it: 
We are not subsidizing the end users because they – the farmers who don’t own 
land and water – are still paying. […] They spend maybe 30 % of the output on 
the water, 30 % on the land and 40 % is for the people who are working on it. 
So, in the end, the farmers only have 40 %, while the owners of the water are not 
paying back the money from the water that they are collecting from the people. 
So, we cannot even consider it a subsidy because for a subsidy, the end user […] 
should benefit. 
e. Improving Access: Availability and Reliability 
A strategy that can lead to improvement regarding this and other access 
dimensions is (17) Protesting on the streets. This was brought up by an informant 
from Fasayil who told us, 
44 
 
Last week we went on a protest […]. We made a deal with the Israelis that we get 
more power. We wanted to go another time […] but they said, ‘Don’t go, we will 
solve this problem’. We had a meeting with them before but after that nothing 
changed. When we closed the street, they realized that they must do something, 
so the protest was successful. We told the Israelis that we have three main 
problems […] but most important is the electricity and the water. 
One of the governance informants, however, highlighted that this strategy was 
dangerous and limited regarding its effect: 
When people make demonstrations […] and the Israeli army comes – What will 
happen? People will go home. The Israeli army will throw some tear gas bombs 
and that’s it. […] Even when the Israeli army invades a refugee camp, for 
instance, the young people will go out to throw stones. But that will not stop the 
Israeli army from killing or arresting or completing the mission that they are 
coming for. […] We are not fighting the occupation. The occupation is uprooting 
us, the occupation is killing us, and the occupation is preventing us from our 
rights. 
f. Improving Access: Safety 
Lastly, some strategies improve people’s access to water regarding safety. In 
general, moving from one place to another in the Jordan Valley already 
constitutes safety risks for Palestinians, especially when it implies passing 
checkpoints. In this respect, strategies that imply a reduction of movement 
positively affect access regarding safety. This is unless the strategy itself poses 
risks such as in the case of (8) Tapping pipes.  
Finally, (18) Raising awareness internally, nationally and internationally can 
improve water access regarding this dimension and other ones. One woman 
who is active at a women center in Aqbat Jaber said that they offered special 
trainings about women’s rights and raised awareness about water. Hence, this 
strategy can change power relations, reducing women’s burdens, and it can 
encourage people to employ strategies more effectively (e.g., (11) Being careful 
with handling water). A similar example was given by employees of a health clinic 
in Al-Jiftlik, who shared that women also come there “to get advice and to talk 
[…] because they often can’t talk about their problems with their men”. A 
young farmer gave yet another example, saying that he was joining theater 
performances in Ramallah where they tried to raise awareness on stage 
“because many Palestinian organizations do not focus on the situation in the 
Jordan Valley”. Lastly, as mentioned in Section 2.4 (p.19), many water users 
expressed their wish for raising awareness internationally such as one man who 
said, “We hope that our voices will reach Europe and the United States and 
that people know how we are suffering here”. In that sense, the perceived 
openness to participate in this research can also partly be interpreted as a 
strategy that could potentially improve their situation.  
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6.2 Gendered Strategies? 
In view of the gendered impacts of water insecurities (Section 5.3, p.36), I tried 
to find out if the responses are gendered as well. In general, tasks that require 
driving vehicles or operating machines (e.g., trucking water, installing tanks) are 
carried out by men, which matches the remark on tasks in agriculture (Section 
5.3, p.38). For (11) Being careful with handling water and (12) Reducing domestic water 
consumption, women play an important role, given that they are mostly involved 
in water-consuming tasks at home. Other strategies like (16) Moving within the 
Jordan Valley or leaving the area are mostly employed at the household level.  
There are differences between men and women regarding who initiates a 
strategy. In the discussion with the extended family in Fasayil that talked about 
(17) Protesting on the streets (Section 6.1, p.44), the father said, “We went to the 
protest and took the women with us”, indicating that men were the initiators 
of that protest. Being asked about who in the household is responsible for 
bringing the water in case of shortage, he explained, 
Of course, I will bring it. My wife will call me at work. Then I call the man who 
brings the water and then she pays the man. […] All my money is with her. 
His sister-in-law who lives with her parents added, “If there is no water, surely, 
my father has to bring it”. Contrarily, an elderly woman from a village close to 
Jericho said that if she was married to a man, she would be responsible for 
bringing the water from the nearby spring. Two women from Aqbat Jaber also 
stated that they were responsible for bringing the water in the household. One 
of them explained that since her husband had passed away, she did the tasks 
that he had used to do. The other one said that she called the man who they 
hire to bring water from Sultan Spring because she was mostly at home: 
“Sometimes my husband does not know that the water was not there during 
the day because I have already arranged everything before he comes home 
from work”. Hence, who performs which tasks to improve water access, not 
only depends on gender but also on individual decisions that vary from 
household to household. 
6.3 Access Strategies as Resilient Resistance 
Governance informants were convinced that the Jordan Valley plays an 
important role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and that it is crucial for the 
Palestinian side that the population stays in the area. One of them shared his 
opinion: “Israel wants all of historic Palestine. The only problem that Israel 
faces is how Palestinians manage themselves”. Another informant said, “It is 
good that people stay because else, the Jordan Valley would be empty [from 
Palestinians]”. Regarding water, one of the respondents argued, 
Everybody knows that water is a basic human right but here, it is a tool for the 
occupation, a victim of or a hostage of the politics, because water is essential for 
a lot of things and by controlling it, Israel controls the fate of the Palestinians. 
These statements and the insecurities discussed before stress that the strategies 
to improve access to water – vital for survival – have both elements of 
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successful adaptation to external threats (resilience) and of challenging the 
experienced conditions (resistance). 
Four lines of argumentation were identified for why informants are 
responding to the conditions the way they do. While they are discussed in 
separate sections, they overlap to some extent. Besides, people often gave 
explanations from several of the categories. 
National Sense 
Many informants explained that they consider it a national duty “to protect the 
land from Israelis”. This argumentation was given by both governance 
informants (e.g., “The aim of cultivation is not economic benefit but to protect 
the land from confiscation”) and water users (e.g., “We stay here because it is 
our land. And we will not sell it, not even for billions of dollars”). Highlighting 
that, from his perspective, it is first of all a national issue, a governance 
informant from the Jordan Valley explained, 
Palestinians have the opportunity to sell their land to the Israeli side, but this is 
not acceptable because […] Israelis have no right to be on it. If, let’s say, the 
Palestinian government […] sends us to another place with better conditions, this 
would be acceptable. […] But they never sell land to Israelis even if they would 
pay triple the amount. 
Connection to the Land, Profession and Lifestyle 
Informants have also expressed special connections with the land as farmers. 
This is captured in statement of one of the governance informants: 
It’s his heritage from his father, grandfather, etc. He grew up there and worked 
on the land. Another thing is that it is his profession. So, if he goes to the city 
and he is a famer, he doesn’t have an opportunity to work his profession and the 
unemployment level is high. 
For Bedouin communities, the need to stay may be even stronger. 
Another governance informant explained, “They need enough space, for the 
family, for the animals, etc. […] If they go to cities, there is not enough space”. 
A man from a Bedouin community himself said that moving to another area 
meant a loss of freedom and giving up on his profession and lifestyle: 
I have about 400 sheep. Where can I go? If I moved to another area, I would 
have to sell my sheep […]. My neighbors would not let me move free there. […] 
I would need three or four people just for supporting the grazing. If all the area 
around is farmland, then you need to make sure that the animals don’t eat from 
that land.  
Best Opportunities 
The question was raised how much agency people have to decide to stay. Many 
informants mentioned that there were no (better) alternatives for the people. A 
PWA informant said, “Give them alternative areas with extra water, with 
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support, […] and they would go”. Agreeing with this, one of the informants 
quoted a saying that he translated to “Wherever you have better living 
conditions, you should be there”. Another one advised me to keep limitations 
of agency in mind when discussing the lives of Palestinians in the Jordan 
Valley: 
The reason why people are not leaving is because they don’t have options. It is 
not only steadfastness. Sumud is a result. You know, we are humans, Michelle. I 
hate making people heroes […]. They are, yes, but as a result. Not because of a 
decision. 
‘Sumud’ 
Some informants, as the one just mentioned who called ‘sumud’ a result from a 
lack of better alternatives, brought up ‘sumud’ to explain why they stay on the 
land. Others elaborated on it after being asked directly. Overall, many 
informants used similar notions of national sense and connection to the land, as 
discussed above, to explain what ‘sumud’ means to them. A woman from 
Aqbat Jaber explained, 
Sumud is everything. It is a sentence that president Yasser Arafat said, which 
means that we are strong and that this is our land and that we will not move 
from here. […] It is a feeling. 
Underlining that ‘sumud’ has collective and personal meaning, another woman 
explained, 
It means patience and staying on this land. I don’t leave my own land like other 
people who get out of Palestine. I am not like them. Sumud has a meaning for 
me personally. 
One of the governance informants also brought up the all-embracing nature of 
‘sumud’: 
Anything we do in the Jordan Valley […] is like a steadfastness message against 
the Israeli plans. So, if you just walk around with your family on your field […], it 
is a steadfastness message because you tell the Israeli settlers […], ‘We are inside 
our land and we will continue to be here’. 
In addition to the notion of lifestyle in the quote above, several informants 
explained that ‘sumud’ was a faith that could not be taken away from 
Palestinians – “It is bigger than me or you or anybody. […] Once you have a 
belief, who can change it?”. 
To make this seemingly all-embracing ‘sumud’ more tangible, several people 
used figurative explanations. In some of them, ‘sumud’ is presented in a dynamic 
way (e.g., as a seed that multiplies, an action of solidarity) and in others as static 




Figurative explanations of ‘sumud’ 
 
Source: Quotes from informants with my visualized imagination. 
While no significant differences between male and female informants 
regarding the understanding of ‘sumud’ were identified, there was a difference 
in the explanations given by water users and governance informants. Water 
users, overall, seemed to enjoy explaining ‘sumud’ and were positive about it. 
Many governance informants, though highlighting the importance of ‘sumud’ 
in people’s lives, criticized its use. One of them said, “Sumud is a great kind of 
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thinking but it also needs action. We cannot only hope for a better future”. 
Another one explained, “You cannot make sumud without resources […]. You 
need to be supported to stay in the land”. Several governance informants 
stressed that ‘sumud’ should not be used as an ‘empty word’ but that it was 
important to practically and emotionally support Palestinians in the Jordan 
Valley through helping them to develop creative solutions by sharing 
information, rules and techniques regarding agriculture with them as well as by 
giving them “the sense that we are together in the same place, that we are 
moving on the same road”. 
Overall, the chapter highlights the strategies devised by Palestinians to 
improve water access reflecting resilience and resistance to the occupation. 
Despite recognizing the hegemonic controls exerted in water governance, 




7  Conclusions 
Water governance in the West Bank and its impacts on the daily lives of 
Palestinians in the Jordan Valley are highly influenced by the nature of the 
Israeli occupation. While water governance in the OPT, according to the Oslo 
II Accord, has been called a joint undertaking between both conflict parties, 
this Research Paper has shown that, in practice, asymmetries of material, 
bargaining and ideational power substantially disadvantage the Palestinian side. 
These asymmetries, exemplified in physical movement and access restrictions, 
hinder development of Palestinian water resources and related services. This 
has led to a situation in which Palestinians in the Jordan Valley suffer from 
serious water insecurities, while water is abundantly accessible to the 
settlements in the same area which are illegal under international law. The 
situation has been worsened by the fragmented division of tasks related to the 
planning, regulation and distribution of water resources among the numerous 
Palestinian water sector actors, with women being rarely included in 
governance.  
The study showed that Palestinians particularly face access problems 
regarding water in acceptable quantity but also regarding the other dimensions 
of access, namely quality, distance and collection time, price and affordability, availability 
and reliability as well as safety, the latter a specific outcome of occupation. These 
water insecurities have had negative impacts on the physical, social and 
psychological well-being of Palestinians. They affect women and girls to an 
even larger extent due to their productive and reproductive roles that 
necessitate access to water (e.g., agricultural work, cleaning, cooking, bathing 
children) as well as due to their higher physiological water needs in comparison 
to men and boys that are partly determined by social norms (e.g., wearing long 
hair and long clothes). 
 Overall, Palestinians’ access to water in the Jordan Valley largely relies on 
private efforts. They include strategies like storing water in tanks or reducing 
domestic water consumption, which often improve several dimensions of access. 
These strategies are flexible and adaptable to unstable and unpredictable 
conditions and commonly employed in a combined manner. The actions taken 
by the Palestinians are not just forms of resilience or successful adaptation to 
the situation of water insecurity. They rather need to be recognized as acts of 
resistance. Palestinians in the Jordan Valley have responded to water 
insecurities promoted by the pervasive nature of occupation with what could 
be called resilient resistance, by both adapting to and challenging the 
experienced conditions.  
The strategies are motivated by the conviction of Palestinians that the land 
on which they live belongs to them and needs to be protected from Israelis. 
Other motivational factors are the strong connection between the land and 
them as farmers and herders as well as a certain lifestyle, which they could not 
lead when leaving the area, or a lack of better alternatives in general. Strategies 
of resilient resistance have also been framed as ‘sumud’ (steadfastness), which 
plays a significant role for Palestinian water users through giving them a sense 
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of connectedness with one another as well as direction, hope and strength. 
However, as pointed out, ‘sumud’ is no ‘magic key’ to solve all problems and 
requires support to be sustained. This is especially the case for Palestinians in 
particularly vulnerable areas like the Jordan Valley whose narratives show that 
despite all aspects of their lives being penetrated by the occupation, they refuse 




Abu-Baker, A. (2017) 'Water-Deprived', SUR 25 International Journal on Human Rights 
14(25): 37-55. 
Ahlers, R. and M. Zwarteveen (2009) 'The Water Question in Feminism: Water 
Control and Gender Inequities in a Neo-Liberal Era', Gender, Place & Culture 
16(4): 409-426. 
Ahren, R. and M. Lidman (2017) 'Israel, Palestinians Reach Landmark Water Deal for 
West Bank, Gaza, 13 July 2017' The Times of Israel. Accessed 14 September 
2019 <https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-palestinians-reach-landmark-
water-deal-for-west-bank-gaza-strip/>. 
Akram, S.M., M. Dumper, M. Lynk and I. Scobbie (eds) (2010) International Law and the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Rights-Based Approach to Middle East Peace. Oxford: 
Routledge. 
Ali, N. (2019) 'Active and Transformative Sumud among Palestinian Activists in 
Israel', in A. Tartir and T. Seidel (eds) Palestine and Rule of Power. Local Dissent Vs. 
International Governance, pp. 71-103. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Ali, N. (2018) 'Lifestyle of Resistance: Palestinian Sumud in Israel as a Form of 
Transformative Resistance', Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security 6(2): 143-
162. 
Aliewi, A. and K. Assaf (2007) 'Shared Management of Palestinian and Israeli 
Groundwater Resources: A Critical Analysis', in H. Shuval and H. Dweik (eds) 
Water Resources in the Middle East. Israel-Palestinian Water Issues – from Conflict to 
Cooperation, pp. 17-32. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer.  
Araral, E. and Y. Wang (2013) 'Water Governance 2.0: A Review and Second 
Generation Research Agenda', Water Resources Management 27: 3945-3957. 
ARIJ (2015) Status of the Environment in the State of Palestine 2015. Jerusalem: Applied 
Research Institute Jerusalem.  
Awwad, N.A. (2016) 'Gender and Settler Colonialism in Palestinian Agriculture: 
Structural Transformations', Arab Studies Quarterly 38(3): 540-561. 
BBC (2019) 'Arab Nations Condemn Netanyahu's Jordan Valley Annexation Plan, 11 
September 2019' The British Broadcasting Corporation. Accessed 8 October 
2019 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-49657915>. 
Bismuth, C., S. Hoestetter and O. Bens (2016) 'Research in Two Case Studies: 
Irrigation and Land use in the Fergana Valley and Water Management in the 
Lower Jordan Valley', in R.F. Hüttl, O. Bens, C. Bismuth and S. Hoechstetter 
(eds) Society - Water - Technology. A Critical Appraisal of Major Water Engineering 
Projects, pp. 89-98. Cham, Switzerland: Springer Open.  
B'Tselem (2019) 'Settlements' The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the 
Occupied Territories. Accessed 3 September 2019 
<https://www.btselem.org/settlements>. 
B'Tselem (2017a) 'The Jordan Valley' The Israeli Information Center for Human 
Rights in the Occupied Territories. Accessed 4 September 2019 
<https://www.btselem.org/jordan_valley>. 
B'Tselem (2017b) 'The Separation Barrier' The Israeli Information Center for Human 




Carmi, N., M. Alsayegh and M. Zoubi (2019) 'Empowering Women in Water 
Diplomacy: A Basic Mapping of the Challenges in Palestine, Lebanon and 
Jordan', Journal of Hydrology 569: 330-346. 
Cascão, A.E. and M. Zeitoun (2010) 'Power, Hegemony and Critical Hydropolitics', in 
A. Earle, A. Jägerskog and J. Öjendal (eds) Transboundary Water Management 
Principles and Practice, pp. 27-42. Oxon: Earthscan.  
Chandler, D. (2012) 'Resilience and Human Security: The Post-Interventionist 
Paradigm', Security Dialogue 43(3): 213-229. 
Cleaver, F. and K. Hamada (2010) '‘Good’ Water Governance and Gender Equity: A 
Troubled Relationship', Gender & Development 18(1): 27-41. 
Dajani, M. and L. Isma'il (2014) Conscious Choices. A Guide to Ethical Consumerism 
in Palestine. Ramallah: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung.  
Daoud, K. (2018) 'Agriculture in the Palestinian Jordan Valley. Current Reality and 
Future Prospects', This Week in Palestine (238): 10-17. 
De Certeau, M. (1984) The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley: University of California 
Press.  
Durán-Sánchez, A., M. Del Río-Rama, J. Álvarez-García and F.F. Castellano-Álvarez 
(2019) 'Scientific Coverage in Water Governance: Systematic Analysis', Water 
11(177): 1-16. 




Empinotti, V.L., J. Budds and M. Aversa (2019) 'Governance and Water Security: The 
Role of the Water Institutional Framework in the 2013–15 Water Crisis in São 
Paulo, Brazil', Geoforum 98: 46-54. 
FAO (2018) Country Programming Framework for Palestine (2018-2022). Jerusalem: 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.  
FAO (2011) Palestinian Womens’ Associations and Agricultural Value Chains. Rome, 
Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.  
Foucault, M. (1990) The History of Sexuality. Volume 1: An Introduction. New York: 
Pantheon Books.  
Foucault, M. (1976) The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: The Will of Knowledge. London: 
Penguin.  
Franks, T. and F. Cleaver (2007) 'Water Governance and Poverty: A Framework for 
Analysis', Progress in Development Studies 7(4): 291-306. 
Glavany, J. (2012) La Géopolitique De L’Eau. Geopolitics of Water [My Translation]. 
Paris: Assemblée Nationale, Commission des Affaires Étrangères.  
Graham-Brown, S. (1990) 'Agriculture and Labour Transformation in Palestine', in K. 
Glavanis and P. Glavanis (eds) The Rural Middle East. Peasant Lives and Modes of 
Production. pp. 53-69. London: Zed Books Ltd.  
GWP (2015) 'Water Governance in Palestine. Sector Reform to Include Private Sector 






GWP (2003) 'Effective Water Governance. Action through Partnership in Central and 
Eastern Europe'. Budapest: Global Water Partnership Central and Eastern 
Europe.  
Haraway, D. (1988) 'Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the 
Privilege of Partial Perspective', Feminist Studies 14(3): 575-599. 
Harding, S. (2015) Objectivity and Diversity. another Logic of Scientific Research. Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press.  
Harding, S. (2005) 'Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is “Strong 
Objectivity”?', in A.E. Cudd and R.O. Anderson (eds) Feminist Theory: A 
Philosophical Anthology, pp. 218-236. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.  
Harding, S. (1991) Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?: Thinking from Women’s Lives. Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press.  
Hareuveni, E. (2011) Dispossession and Exploitation. Israeli's Policy in the Jordan Valley and 
Northern Dead Sea. Jerusalem: B'Tselem.  
Hesse-Biber, S.N. and A. Brooks (2007) 'An Invitation to Feminist Research', in S.N. 
Hesse-Biber and P.L. Leavy (eds) Feminist Research Practice, pp. 1-24. London: Sage 
Publications Ltd.  
M. Hmaidi (2019) ' نسبة مجرد او تكريم ليس الموضوع . Not a Matter of a Mere Percentage 
[My Translation]' Facebook. Accessed 13 September 2019 
<https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=6512810287023
75&id=100014614504450>. 
Howard, G. and J. Bartram (2003) 'Domestic Water Quality, Service Level and Health 
(WHO/SDE/WSH/03.02)'. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization.  
HRW (2015) Ripe for Abuse. Palestinian Child Labor in Israeli Agricultural 
Settlements in the West Bank. New York: Human Rights Watch.  
Icaza, R. (2017) 'Social Struggles and the Coloniality of Gender', in R. Shilliam and O. 
Rutazibwa (eds) Routledge Handbook of Postcolonial Politics, pp. 58-71. London: 
Routledge.  
ICRC (2018) 'Practice Relating to Rule 130. Transfer of Own Civilian Population into 
Occupied Territory' International Committee of the Red Cross. Accessed 4 
September 2019 <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule130>. 
IFAD (2017) 'Palestine. Resilient Land & Resource Management Project. Final Project 




Isaac, J. and J. Hilal (2011) 'Palestinian Landscape and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict', 
International Journal of Environmental Studies 68(4): 413-429. 
Jackson, D., A. Firtko and M. Edenborough (2007) 'Personal Resilience as a Strategy 
for Surviving and Thriving in the Face of Workplace Adversity: A Literature 
Review', Journal of Advanced Nursing 60(1): 1-9. 
Jarrar, S. (2018) Unpacking Gender in Coercive Environments: The Case of the Jordan Valley. 
Ramallah, West Bank: Al-Haq.  
Jepson, W., J. Budds, L. Eichelberger, L. Harris, E. Norman, K. O’Reilly et al. (2017) 
'Advancing Human Capabilities for Water Security: A Relational Approach', 
Water Security 1: 46-52. 
55 
 
Kelly, T. (2006) 'Documented Lives: Fear and the Uncertainties of Law during the 
Second Palestinian Intifada', The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 12(1): 
89-107. 
Khamaisi, R. (2008) 'From Imposed Ceasefire Line to International Border: The Issue 
of the Green Line between Palestine and Israel', Journal of Borderlands Studies 23(1): 
85-102. 
Koek, E. (2013) Water for One People Only: Discriminatory Access and 'Water-Apartheid' in 
the OPT. Ramallah, West Bank: Al-Haq.  
T. Lazaroff (2019) 'Netanyahu: Giving Up the Jordan Valley Will Ensure War, 27 June 
2019' The Jerusalem Post. Accessed 5 September 2019 
<https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Netanyahu-Giving-up-
the-Jordan-Valley-will-ensure-war-593911>. 
Le More, A. (2008) International Assistance to the Palestinians After Oslo. Political Guilt, 
Wasted Money. Oxon, UK: Routledge.  
Lilja, S. and S. Vinthagen (2018) 'Dispersed Resistance: Unpacking the Spectrum and 
Properties of Glaring and Everyday Resistance', Journal of Political Power 11(2): 
211-229. 
Loftus, A. (2015) 'Water (in)Security: Securing the Right to Water', The Geographical 
Journal 181(4): 350-356. 
Lukes, S. (2005 [1974]) Power: A Radical View. (2 edn) Hampshire and New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan.  
MA'AN (2012) The Status of Palestinian Agriculture in the Jordan Valley. Ramallah: 
MA’AN Development Center.  
MA'AN (2010) Eye on the Jordan Valley. Ramallah: MA'AN Development Center 
and Jordan Valley Popular Committees.  
Marie, M., B. Hannigan and A. Jones (2018) 'Social Ecology of Resilience and Sumud 
of Palestinians', Health 22(1): 20-35. 
Melon, M. (2018) Settling Area C: The Jordan Valley Exposed. Ramallah, West Bank: Al-
Haq.  
Messerschmid, C. (2014) 'Hydro-Apartheid and Water Access in Israel-Palestine: 
Challenging the Myths of Cooperation and Scarcity', in M. Turner and O. 
Shweiki (eds) Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy. De-Development and Beyond, 
pp. 53-76. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.  
Messerschmid, C. (2007) 'What Price Cooperation? Hydro-Hegemony in Shared 
Israeli/Palestinian Groundwater Resources', International Conference on 
Sustainable Development and Management of Water Resources in Palestine. 
August 2007. Amman. 
MOA (2017) National Agriculture Sector Strategy (2017-2022). Ramallah: The State of 
Palestine Ministry of Agriculture.  
Naguib, N. (2009) Women, Water and Memory: Recasting Lives in Palestine. Leiden, The 
Netherlands: Brill.  
L. Napikoski (2019) 'Patriarchal Society According to Feminism. Feminist Theories of 
Patriarchy' ThoughtCo. Accessed 13 September 2019 
<https://www.thoughtco.com/patriarchal-society-feminism-definition-
3528978>. 
Nganyanyuka, K., J. Martinez, A. Wesselink and J.H. Lungo (2014) 'Accessing Water 




OCHA (2018) 'Over 700 Road Obstacles Control Palestinian Movement within the 
West Bank' The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs. Accessed 3 September 2019 
<https://www.ochaopt.org/content/over-700-road-obstacles-control-
palestinian-movement-within-west-bank>. 
OCHA (2015) Fragmented Lives Humanitarian Overview 2014. East Jerusalem: 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.  
OCHA (2011) 'Jordan Valley and Dead Sea Area. December 2011' The United 




Özerol, G., J. Vinke-de Kruijf, M.C. Brisbois, C. Casiano Flores, P. Deekshit, C. 
Girard et al. (2018) 'Comparative Studies of Water Governance: A Systematic 
Review', Ecology and Society 23(4): 43-71. 
PCBS (2016) 'Palestinians at the End of 2016' Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. 
Accessed 4 September 2019 
<http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/post.aspx?ItemID=1823&lang=en>. 
Peteet, J.M. (1991) Gender in Crisis: Women and the Palestinian Resistance Movement. New 
York and Oxford: Colombia University Press.  
PWA (2017) 'Water Resources' Palestinian Water Authority. Accessed 7 September 
2019 <http://www.pwa.ps/page.aspx?id=2orqcWa2546891028a2orqcW>. 
PWA (2016) Water Authority Strategic Plan 2016-2018. Ramallah: Palestinian Water 
Authority.  
PWA (2013a) Final Water Sector Reform Plan 2014-2016. Ramallah: Palestinian Water 
Authority.  
PWA (2013b) Status Report of Water Resources in the Occupied State of Palestine - 
2012. Ramallah: Palestinian Water Authority.  
Richter-Devroe, S. (2013) 'Palestinian Women’s Everyday Resistance: Between 
Normality and Normalisation', Journal of International Women’s Studies 12(2): 32-46. 
Ryan, C. (2015) 'Everyday Resilience as Resistance: Palestinian Women Practicing 
Sumud', International Political Sociology 9(4): 299-315. 
Said, E.W. (1984) 'Permission to Narrate', Journal of Palestine Studies 13(3): 27-48. 
Scott, J.W. (1986) 'Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis', The American 
Historical Review 91(5): 1053-1075. 
Scott, J.C. (1985) Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven, 
Conn.: Yale University Press.  
Seidel, T. and A. Tartir (2019) 'The Rule of Power in Palestine: Settler Colonialism, 
Neoliberal Governance, and Resistance.', in A. Tartir and T. Seidel (eds) Palestine 
and Rule of Power. Local Dissent Vs. International Governance, pp. 1-19. Cham, 
Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Selby, J. (2013) 'Cooperation, Domination and Colonisation: The Israeli-Palestinian 
Joint Water Committee', Water Alternatives 6(1): 1-24. 
Selby, J. (2003) 'Dressing Up Domination as 'Cooperation': The Case of Israeli-
Palestinian Water Relations', Review of International Studies 29(1): 121-138. 
Shadeed, S.M., T.G. Judeh and M.N. Almasri (2019) 'Developing GIS-Based Water 
Poverty and Rainwater Harvesting Suitability Maps for Domestic use in the Dead 
57 
 
Sea Region (West Bank, Palestine)', Hydrology and Earth System Sciences 23: 1581-
1592. 
Shalhoub-Kerkovian, N. and R. Busbridge (2014) '(En)Gendering De-Development in 
East Jerusalem: Thinking through the ‘Everyday’', in M. Turner and O. Shweiki 
(eds) Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy. De-Development and Beyond, pp. 77-94. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.  
UN (2018) 'Gender and Wash Toolkit for Palestine' United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Shelter Cluster. Accessed 16 September 2019 
<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/gender_toolkit.
pdf>. 
UN (2011) 'West Bank: Area C – OCHA Map (Image)' United Nations - The 
Question of Palestine. Accessed 3 July 2019 
<https://www.un.org/unispal/west-bank-area-c-ocha-map/>. 
UNDP (2006) Human Development Report 2006: Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty 
and the Global Water Crisis. New York, NY: Oxford University Press for 
UNDP.  
UNDP (1994) Human Development Report 1994. New York: United Nations 
Development Programme.  
UNICEF and GVC (2010) 'Assessment of Water Availability and Access in the Areas 
Vulnerable to Drought in the Jordan Valley' United Nations Children's Fund and 
Gruppo di Volontariato Civile. Accessed 13 September 2019 
<http://ecopeaceme.org/uploads/UNICEF_Water_2010.pdf>. 
Warner, J., Mirumachi, N., Farnum, R. L., Grandi, M., Menga, F., and M. Zeitoun 
(2017) ‘Transboundary ‘hydro-hegemony’: 10 years later. Wiley Interdisciplinary 
Reviews: Water 4(6):1-13 [e1242]. doi: 10.1002/wat2.1242 
WB (2018) 'Toward Water Security for Palestinians. West Bank and Gaza Water 
Supply, Sanitation, and Hygiene Poverty Diagnostic' The World Bank. Accessed 
13 September 2019 
https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/30316?download=true 
WB (2009) West Bank and Gaza: Assessment of Restrictions on Palestinian Water 
Sector Development. Report no. 47657-GZ. Washington: The World Bank.  
Wildeman, J. (2019) 'Neoliberalism as Aid for the Settler Colonization of the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories After Oslo', in A. Tartir and T. Seidel (eds) 
Palestine and Rule of Power. Local Dissent Vs. International Governance, pp. 153-174. 
Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Zeitoun, M. and J. Warner (2006) 'Hydro-Hegemony – A Framework for Analysis of 
Trans-Boundary Water Conflicts', Water Policy 8: 435-460. 
Zwarteveen, M. (2015) Regulating Water, Ordering Society: Practices and Politics of Water 
Governance. Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam.  
Zwarteveen, M., J.S. Kemerink-Seyoum, M. Kooy, J. Evers, T.A. Guerrero, B. 
Batubara et al. (2017) 'Engaging with the Politics of Water Governance', Wiley 





Appendix 1: Thirsty Roots  
Source: Pencil on paper, A2; Drawing by Michelle Rudolph, August 2019. 
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Appendix 2: Institutions associated with the 14 interviews conducted 
with the ‘governance informants’ on different aspects of the 
research topic 
Code name Institution Description 
G1 Al-Haq Independent Palestinian Human-Rights Organization 
G2 UAWC Union of Agricultural Work Committees 
G3 MA’AN Independent, Non-Governmental, Non-Partisan  
Palestinian Development and Training Institution 
G4 Jericho 
Municipality 
Municipality of Jericho, Jordan Valley 
G5 Jericho 
Municipality 
Municipality of Jericho, Jordan Valley 
G6 Al-Haq Independent Palestinian Human-Rights Organization 
G7 PHG Palestinian Hydrology Group 
G8 PWA Palestinian Water Authority 
G9 NRO Netherlands Representative Office to the Palestinian 
National Authority 
G10 WEDO Water and Environmental Development  
Organization 
G11 MOA Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture 
G12 PWA Palestinian Water Authority 
G13 PWA Palestinian Water Authority 










Appendix 3: Map of the Jordan Valley (without northern Dead Sea area) 
with rough indication of the locations of the 13 interviews 
conducted with ‘water users’ in the Jordan Valley  
(code names: U1 – U13) 
 
 
  Source: after UN 2011, OCHA 2011. 
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Appendix 4: Administrative division of the West Bank into 11 
governorates  
 











Appendix 5: Interview guide for the 14 interviews conducted with the 






 Name of the institution 
 Name / code of the interviewee 
  Gender 
 Age / age range 
 Role of the interviewee in the institution 
 
Personal Introduction  
 My background 
 Research objectives and limitations  
 Explanation of how the interview is built up 
 Confidentiality 
 Question about notes and recording 
 
Do you have any questions before we start? 
 
General Questions 
1.  Could you describe what you are doing in this institution? 




3. How is the distribution of water organized and coordinated in the West 
Bank / The Jordan Valley? By whom / Who are the most important 
actors involved in the distribution on different levels? Do you see any 
division between the engagement of women and men (gendered 
division of labor) in the different relevant institutions (water authority, 
local government, etc.)? 
4. What laws or regulations that determine the distribution of water are 
most relevant, from your point of view? From your point of view, are 
these laws or regulations complied with in reality? 
5. What is your opinion about the way water is governed in the West 
Bank? 
6. What, if anything, would you change / recommend changing first to 




7. From your point of view, what role does agriculture play in the West 
Bank / What role does the Jordan Valley play for agriculture? Has this 
always been the case? 
8. What kind of agriculture is most dominant for Palestinian farmers? Has 
this always been the case? If no: What has changed, how, when and 
why? 
 
Questions related to the Effect on People’s Lives 
Access to Water 
9. Do you happen to know what sources of water people engaged in 
agriculture in the Jordan Valley have? Has this always been the case? 
10. Do you know how much people pay for water?  
11. Has the price changed over time? 
12. Do you think they are satisfied with the quality, quantity, access and 
cost? Why? If not: If they would be given (easier) access to (more / 
cleaner / cheaper) water, how would you recommend them to use it? 
Challenges 
13. What do you think are the greatest challenges regarding water that 
these people face? 
14. What, in your eyes, are the main causes of these challenges? 
15. Are there specific time frames in which these challenges often occur? If 
so, when and do you know why? 
16. Do you think there are differences between the challenges that men 
face and challenges that women face? If yes, in what way and why? 
How do you feel about this? 
17. What would you do / recommend doing first to prevent challenges in 
future? 
18. (Do you know if there are any controls placed by Israel? How do 
people respond to them?) 
Choices  
19. What, from your point of view, motivates Palestinian people to 
continue their work in agriculture? 
20. Some people told me about the idea of ‘sumud’ and I was wondering if 
this somehow relates to what you told me. Do you know what it is and 
if yes, could you explain how you under-stand it? Could you tell me if 
you think it relates to what we have discussed? If yes, how? 
 
That was my last question. Is there anything that you would like to add? / Do 
you have any further recommendation for my project (people to talk to, 
literature, etc.)? Do you have any questions? May I, in case I have any further 
questions, come back to you? 
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Appendix 6: Interview guide for the 13 interviews conducted with ‘water 
users’ in the Jordan Valley 
Interview information  
 Date 
 Location 
 Name / code of the interviewee 
 Occupation / work 
 Gender 
 Age / age range 
 
Personal Introduction  
 My background 
 Research objectives and limitations  
 Explanation of how the interview is built up 
 Confidentiality 
 Question about notes and recording 
 
Do you have any questions before we start? 
 
Life- and Work-related Questions 
Home 
1. Could you describe your daily routine (activities, tasks etc.)? Do you 
live alone or with other people? If with other people: With whom? 
How is the work at home distributed at home? 
 
Work 
2. What do you consider as your main job? Could you describe in detail 
what you do? When have you started with this job? Were there other 
opportunities you considered? / Why have you started this job? How 
much time do you spend on this type of work? How do you combine 
this work, if at all, with your work at home? 
 
Income 
3. Who owns the land you are working on? If you: Do you sell the crops 
from the land and who is responsible for that? If the land is not yours: 
How do you get paid? Is the income coming from this work sufficient 
for you to sustain yourself / your family? If not: Do you have another 







Use and Access 
4. What do you need water for in your private life and work?  
5. How much water do you use? 
6. Where does the water you use come from (rain, tanker, pipe, tab etc.)? 
How far is the source away from you where you use the water? Who 
fetches the water? Any support from others (family, boys, girls)? How 
much time do you spend on a normal day for water needs? Has that 
always been more or less the same? Who pays for the water and how 
much, if anything? Has the price always been more or less the same or 
changed over time? (Management of pressures from changing 
expenditure?) Who else has access to this water (influenced by class, 
religion, ethnicity etc.)? Who, if anyone, determines the access? Have 
there been any significant changes in the recent period?  
7. Are you satisfied with how much water you get; how clean the water is 
and with the access / cost? Why? If not satisfied: If you had (easier) 
access to (more / cleaner / cheaper) water, how would you use it? 
 
Challenge-related Questions 
8. What are the greatest challenges that you face with regard to water in 
your life and work? 
9. What are the main causes of these challenges?  
10. Are there specific time frames in which these challenges often occur? If 
so, when and do you know why? 
11. How did you feel when facing these challenges? 
12. How have you coped with these challenges? 
13. What would you do / recommend doing to prevent these challenges in 
future? 
14. Do you know of other people who have had similar / different 
problems? 
15. Do you see differences in how these problems affect women compared 
to men? If yes, in what way and why? How do you feel about this? 
(Could you elaborate on that…?) 
16. (Are there any controls placed by Israel? If yes: Could you explain? 
How do you respond?)  
 
Choice-related Questions 
17. What motivates you to do this agricultural work (even though you face 
all these challenges)? Do you ever consider changing the kind of work 





18. Some people told me about the idea of ‘sumud’ and I was wondering if 
this somehow relates to what you told me. Do you know what it is and 
if yes, could you explain how you under-stand it? Could you tell me if it 
means something to you in relation to what we have discussed? If yes, 
how? 
That was my last question. Thank you very much for taking time and giving me 
the opportunity to learn from you. Is there anything that you would like to 
add? Do you have any questions? May I, in case I have any further questions, 

























Appendix 7: Institutional organigram of the water sector in the West 
Bank (state 2009)  
 
 Source: WB 2009: 15. 
 
The diagram shows that the policy, planning and regulatory roles belonged to 
an interministerial body, namely the National Water Council (NWC) which, 
however, had met only once by then and to the Joint Water Committee (JWC), 
the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) as well as relevant ministries like the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and the Ministry of Local Governance 
(MOLG) (WB 2009: 15). On the service side, water supply was carried out by 
the Israeli water company Mekorot, the West Bank Water Department 
(WBWD), the PWA as well as through municipal or private well operators 
(WB 2009: 15). In urban areas, the distribution was ensured by regional utilities 
like the Jerusalem Water Undertaking (JWU) or the Water Supply and Sewage 
Authority (WSSA) that serves Bethlehem and neighboring towns and by 
municipal utilities (WB 2009: 15). In rural areas, water was distributed by so-
called Village Council Water Departments and Joint Service Councils (WB 




Appendix 8: A. Framework of the Palestinian water sector according to 
the 2002 Water Law; B. Framework of the Palestinian water 
sector according to the 2014 Water Law  
   A 
 
* Project Management Unit (PMU); West Bank Water Department (WBWD);  
   Jerusalem Water Undertaking (JWU); Water Supply and Sewage Authority 
   (WSSA) 
   B 
 
Source: GWP 2015: 20. 
 
A detailed explanation of both frameworks can be found in GWP (2015: pp. 
15 ff.). Annex A1.1 (pp. 71-73) of GWP (2015) also tabulates all roles and 




Appendix 9: List of suggestions made by Palestinian governance 
informants (incl. quotes) to improve conditions for 
Palestinians in the Jordan Valley / West Bank from a 
governance perspective.  
 
The suggestions listed here have been made by Palestinian governance informants 
during the interviews conducted in the context of this research. They are included as 
they may invite for further research into creative solutions of some of the issues raised 
in the context of this research. It should be noted that they have not been studied 
regarding their potential, feasibility, etc. and, hence, they should be treated with 
caution. 
 
• Finding a ‘political solution’ (e.g., increased access for Palestinians to 
land and to water resources in Area C) 
“Without solving the political problem, there is no solution.” 
 “The only solution is that Israelis give up occupied land […]. If they don’t 
want that, they will pay the cost in the future, because the young generations 
feel their dignity is threatened and this will create a lot of problems with Israe-
lis, which I don’t wish for – violence from anyone. But Israelis will face a lot 
of violence against themselves because they left the Palestinians without any 
solution. They don’t want one state; they don’t want two states; they don’t 
want to leave us our dignity. If you put a cat in the corner, it will scratch you.” 
“The main obstacle for the water solution is the conflict. Imagine even in 
general, not only in Palestine, how much money is spent for conflicts. If there 
was no conflict, […] imagine what you could do with that money. If there was 
some kind of peace, then there could be more cooperation. […] Peace would 
be win-win. It would also be good for Israelis because with regional coopera-
tion solutions become easier.” 
• Governmental support and management of the agricultural sector (e.g., 
improved legislation, agricultural insurances, cutting taxes, agricultural 
subsidies, not only emergency support but also protective support prior 
to demolitions etc., rotational cultivation) 
• Establishing a committee (with strategic planners, experts in water, 
land, economics etc.) to implement a strategy 
“… because now we live in a chaos. Every farmer is doing what they want 
and not following the need of the market. This is why they don’t make a lot 
of money. They think that tomatoes will become be profitable and that is why 
they cultivate tomatoes. Then they find that they are not.” 
“Demand management is important. We have to give up some crops like ba-
nanas that consume a lot of water.” 
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“The ministry of agriculture should have good cooperation with the farmers 
[…]. They should focus on profitable crops. […] Greenhouses and dripping 
pipes are water consuming. If you increase awareness, this will increase water 
availability.” 
• Encouraging farmers to use new agricultural techniques and methods 
(e.g., producing organic products to avoid pesticides and chemicals 
with no health risks and to increase productivity) 
• Increasing accountability and transparency in governmental institu-
tions to improve performance and international reputation 
“Only when the Palestinian National Authority does an outstanding job […], 
the international community cannot point their finger at the Palestinian Na-
tional Authority anymore and say, ‘The reason for why things are not advanc-
ing here is all because of you’.” 
• Proceeding in clarifying mandates and responsibilities of actors in the 
Palestinian water sector (e.g., merging institutions, capacity building of 
utilities) 
• Nationalizing all water resources 
“If we want to control the water, it cannot be private ownership of anyone. It 
should be public ownership.” 
• Building two national systems for freshwater and wastewater to dis-
tribute water  
- Buying water rights from farmers in urbanized areas and using that water 
for domestic purposes where needed 
- Diverting treated wastewater from bigger cities to the east to increase 
supply for the agricultural sector with little risk for pollution of the 
groundwater resources due to low groundwater recharge in the east 
• Investing in wastewater treatment and reuse / Treating wastewater and 
using it for agricultural purposes to reduce freshwater use 
“We need to invest […] in the wastewater treatment and reuse. Now we are 
investing in it but in terms of reuse it is still a big problem. Israel is a world 
leader in the treatment and reuse of the wastewater. But Palestinians need to 
be convinced that if we reuse water, it does not mean that more freshwater 
goes to Israel. People say, ‘Why should we protect our water resources if Isra-
el is using them?’. Sustainable agriculture will depend on wastewater, because 
this is the only sustainable resource. This is the only resource that keeps in-
creasing, and treatment of wastewater is not an option; it is a must.” 
“All wastewater that is flowing from Palestine into Israel is treated on the Is-
raeli side. […] Everything treated is being deducted from the tax bills as well. 
So, they treat water and take money for it, and to some extent you can’t doubt 
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that because, obviously, it does cost money to treat the water. But what is 
strange is that they are not transparent about how much is being treated and 
how much they charge per cubic meter. They even built a wastewater treat-
ment plant on the Israeli side and let the Palestinians pay for it. Then they 
treat water and they use the treated water for irrigation. So, it is win-win-win 
for them.” 
“The treated wastewater from Nablus goes to the west and on the way, it gets 
polluted through Palestinian towns that don’t have sewage systems. By the 
time it crosses the Greenline, it is polluted – maybe little but Israel considers 
it polluted and charges the Palestinians. So, we are paying for the treatment of 
our wastewater twice: the first time to ourselves, the second time to Israel.” 
• Tackling the water-energy-food security nexus 
“It is very important to be independent from Israel regarding energy for the 
water sector […]. We have deep aquifers, so the cost of the energy to pump 
water is one of the highest shares regarding the water expenses. So, now we 
are moving to the idea of energy from wind turbines as well as solar energy. 
Renewable energy would make water services more affordable […]. We are 
not allowed at this stage to import wind turbines. Israelis put some technical 
or environmental constraints. […] On the paper, we see that we have the 
power in Area A […] but on the ground [it is different] […]. We are asking to 
have the wind turbines in Area A. Regarding the location, they cannot say an-
ything, but they came up with […] that the importation of the wind turbines 
must be approved from their side. We don’t have the manufacture of materi-
al. We import most of the materials that we use. So, whenever we want to 
import a pump or like in this case wind turbine, we need to have their ac-
ceptance, and they want to know where exactly we are putting this pump and 
the wind turbine. So, they have another way to control it. On the ground, […] 
they control Areas A, B and C […] because we have the borders with them, 
and we cannot get the materials in a different way.” 
“Ninety percent of Jordan is desert which has no economic value right now. 
You could invest in solar energy in the Jordan desert and the energy could be 
easily transferred to Israel and Palestine for desalination because of small dis-
tances. Water could then be sent to Jordan. […] But in the absence of peace 
this remains only on paper or in the heads of people.” 
• Increasing pressure from the international community on Israel to 
comply with rights for Palestinians 
 
